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Abstract
We study how popular rationales enable public anti-minority actions. Rationales to oppose minori-
ties genuinely persuade some people. But they also provide “excuses” that may reduce the stigma
associated with anti-minority expression, thereby increasing anti-minority behavior. In a first ex-
periment, participants learn that a previous respondent authorized a donation to an anti-immigrant
organization and then make an inference about the respondent’s underlying motivations. Partic-
ipants informed that their matched respondent learned about a study claiming that immigrants
increase crime rates before authorizing the donation see the respondent as less intolerant. In a
second experiment, participants learn about that same study and then choose whether to authorize
a public donation to the anti-immigrant organization. Participants informed that their exposure
to the rationale will be publicly observable are substantially more likely to make the donation than
participants who are informed that their exposure will remain private. A final experiment shows
that people are more willing to post anti-immigrant content on social media when they can use an
anti-immigrant video clip from Fox News as an excuse. Our findings suggest that prominent pub-
lic figures can lower the social cost of intolerant expression by popularizing rationales, increasing
anti-minority expression.
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1 Introduction
Political leaders and popular segments of the media have increasingly embraced a nativist rhetoric.
A growing body of historical and contemporaneous evidence suggests that such rhetoric can substan-
tially increase hostility toward immigrants and other minorities branded “non-native” (Djourelova,
2020). Anti-immigrant rhetoric typically features rationales justifying this hostility — for example,
claims that immigrants disproportionately commit violent crimes or welfare fraud, or that they
steal jobs from natives — most of which have little to no basis in fact.
Why do these rationales work? One obvious explanation is that they are persuasive: people be-
lieve them even when they are divorced from reality. For example, anti-immigrant narratives spread
by prominent public figures may have influenced people’s opinions — one possible explanation for
the growing wave of anti-immigrant rhetoric and violence in the United States.1 Yet while per-
suasion is undoubtedly one mechanism driving these effects, a persuasion mechanism alone seems
unable to reconcile some patterns in the data. Survey evidence suggests that both Democrats and
Republicans reported feeling, if anything, more warmly toward both legal and illegal immigrants
in 2018 than in 2014 (Gonzalez-Barrera and Connor, 2019). Consistent with this observation, re-
cent experimental work finds relatively small or null effects of information on immigration policy
preferences (Hopkins et al., 2019; Alesina et al., 2019; Grigorieff et al., 2020). Together, the evi-
dence suggests that mechanisms beyond persuasion may be driving trends in public anti-immigrant
expression.
In this paper, we propose an additional mechanism through which the spread of anti-minority
narratives might affect public behavior. By popularizing rationales, public figures can enable in-
tolerant expression by lowering the social cost of publicly voicing otherwise-stigmatized positions.
For example, consider people who oppose immigration from Mexico simply because they dislike
Mexicans, yet cannot express this opposition in a public setting without incurring social costs.
Suppose that an anti-Mexican rationale is then widely popularized (e.g., a presidential candidate
claims that Mexican immigrants are disproportionately violent criminals).2 These people then have
an excuse for publicly expressing their anti-Mexican beliefs: they can attribute their position to
1For example, the number of white nationalist hate groups in the United States grew by 55 percent between
January 2017 and March 2020. (“White Nationalist Hate Groups Have Grown 55% in Trump Era, Report Finds.”
The Guardian, March 18, 2020.) Islamophobic rhetoric among elected officials at all levels of government has also
increased substantially. (“Islamophobia in the US: It Goes Way beyond Trump.” Vox News, April 6, 2018.)
2In the United States, the Trump administration used a variety of rationales to justify the construction of the US–
Mexico border wall: among them, the claim that Mexican immigrants are violent criminals and rapists, that Islamic
terrorists enter the country over the border, that undocumented immigrants take jobs from American workers, and
that Mexican immigrants take jobs from American workers.
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a belief that Mexican immigrants are violent criminals, whether or not they privately believe the
rationale is true.3 The key point is that the availability of the excuse opens up explanations other
than prejudice for their anti-Mexican positions: it allows them to pool with others who are not
prejudiced, but who were persuaded by the rationale. This pooling reduces the extent to which
observers update about their prejudice and thus increases their willingness to express anti-minority
views. Thus, even if the rationale has no direct persuasive impact, it can serve as an excuse as long
as it is plausible that others might be persuaded.4 Given that 62 percent of Americans (and 77 per-
cent of conservatives) agree that “The political climate these days prevents me from saying things
I believe because others might find them offensive,” such rationales may facilitate anti-minority ex-
pression by allowing people to couch their stigmatized beliefs in a socially acceptable veneer.5 The
endorsement of rationales by prominent figures such as politicians and television hosts may be par-
ticularly effective: rationales supported by such figures may be more credible, not only persuading
more people but also allowing others to more credibly claim they have been persuaded.6
In Experiment 1, conducted with a broadly representative sample of 3,047 Democrats, we
study whether the availability of an excuse affects how xenophobic actions are interpreted. Our
experiment examines one of the most widespread excuses for anti-immigrant expression: the claim
that immigrants disproportionately commit violent crime. We match participants with a respondent
from a previous study who authorized a donation to “Fund the Wall,” an organization raising funds
for the US–Mexico border wall. We begin by informing participants about a recent study (Lott,
2018) claiming that undocumented immigrants in Arizona commit crimes at substantially higher
rates than comparable US citizens, and we also inform them that the study’s methodology has
been widely challenged.7 Our key treatment varies whether our participants believe that their
3In many situations, this mechanism amounts to disguising taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957) as statistical
discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973).
4We formalize this intuition in Appendix A.
5See “Poll: 62% of Americans Say They Have Political Views They’re Afraid to Share.” Cato Institute, July 22,
2020.
6In the extreme, rationales that are sufficiently salient may not even need to be evoked directly.
7The Trump administration cited this study repeatedly as evidence for the impact of illegal immigration on crime.
For example, in a January 2018 speech on “national security and immigration priorities of the administration,” then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions claimed that the study proved that “tens of thousands of crimes have been committed
in this country that would never have happened if our immigration laws were enforced and respected like they ought
to be”. (Sessions, Jeff. “Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on National Security and Immigration Priorities
of the Administration.” Justice News, January 26, 2018.) We also inform respondents that many researchers have
challenged the study’s validity (Nowrasteh, 2018), and to further ensure that they are not left with a distorted view
of the relationship between immigration and crime, we provide respondents with a short summary of the empirical
evidence on the effects of immigration on crime and a link to a relevant meta-analysis at the end of the experiment
(Ousey and Kubrin, 2018), which highlights, if anything, a negative association between increases in immigration and
crime.
2
matched respondent knew about the study before making their decision: participants in the Excuse
condition are matched with a respondent who knew about the study before making their decision,
while participants in the No Excuse condition are matched with a respondent who did not know
about the study. We examine whether participants infer that respondents who had this “excuse”
for donating are less intolerant than participants who donated without an excuse. We also examine
whether participants infer that respondents who had an excuse for donating did so for another
reason. These other reasons might differ across contexts, audiences, and rationales, and might
include economic hardship, fear for one’s family’s safety, or personal experiences. Perhaps the
reason common to the widest range of settings is persuasion — people can claim that they genuinely
believe the rationale — and this is therefore the reason we examine.
To most closely capture the natural process of inference and to avoid priming respondents,
we first measure participants’ beliefs about their matched respondents’ motives for donating to
Fund the Wall using an open-ended question, directly measuring what “comes to mind” through a
pre-registered text analysis procedure. We then turn to more structured measures of beliefs: half
of the participants make an incentivized guess about their matched respondent’s score on a test
measuring cultural tolerance, while the other half make an incentivized guess about their matched
respondent’s score on a test measuring one possible second type: gullibility.
We find strong treatment effects on both measures of type inference. In describing why they
believed their matched respondent chose to donate to Fund the Wall, participants matched with
a respondent who had no excuse for donating are 7 percentage points (70%) more likely to use a
word related to intolerance (p < 0.01). They are also 3 percentage points (43%) less likely to use
a word related to gullibility (p < 0.01). We find similar treatment effects on the structured belief
measures: participants believe that a matched respondent with an excuse scored 0.14 standard
deviations lower on the intolerance scale (p < 0.01) and 0.32 standard deviations higher score on
the gullibility scale (p < 0.01).8
Taken together, our evidence suggests that publicly known rationales for xenophobic behavior
strongly influence how an audience updates about the underlying motives. In an auxiliary experi-
ment, we show that participants are less likely to punish gullible partners than intolerant partners,
8Gullibility is of course only one of a set of potential reasons for engaging in stigmatized behavior after being
exposed to a rationale. Other potential “second types” include lower tolerance for crime, higher levels of risk aversion,
etc. Conceptually, we model all of these other “second types” in a reduced-form manner and refer to them collectively
as “persuadability”. In practice, we examine gullibility rather than other possible dimensions of persuadability in this
experiment because it is perhaps the most easily generalizable “second type” across different contexts, and because
it is most consistently coded.
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consistent with our assumption that xenophobia is indeed more socially sanctioned than gullibility.
In Experiment 2, we investigate whether people exploit widespread rationales to avoid the
social stigma associated with publicly expressing intolerant views. Specifically, we recruit a broadly
representative sample of 3,728 Republicans and Independents and examine whether they are more
willing to publicly undertake an anti-immigrant action — authorizing a donation to Fund the Wall
— when they have an excuse available. We inform all participants about the Lott (2018) study,
which claims that undocumented immigrants commit crimes at much higher rates than US citizens,
and then give participants the opportunity to authorize a $1 donation to Fund the Wall. We tell
participants that we will post their individual donation decisions on our website when the study
is published in an academic journal, and that in order to communicate our research findings to
the public, we will publicize the website among residents in their city. This generates a real social
cost of authorizing a donation, particularly in areas where participants expect the majority of the
population to disapprove of the donation.
Identifying the “excuse effect” requires disentangling it both from the direct effect of persuasion
(“first-order” persuasion) and from a change in anticipated social approval associated with changes
in the audience’s beliefs (“second-order” persuasion). We hold first- and second-order persuasion
fixed across the Excuse and No Excuse condition; thus, the key treatment varies only the avail-
ability of an excuse for donating. In particular, participants in the Excuse condition see that their
audience will learn that they knew about the Lott study when making the donation decision, while
participants in the No Excuse condition believe that their audience will not know that they knew
about the Lott study.
We find a large and statistically significant excuse effect on participants’ willingness to publicly
donate to Fund the Wall. Participants in the Excuse condition are 6.3 percentage points (13%)
more likely to authorize the donation than respondents in the No Excuse condition (p < 0.01).
To benchmark the effect size, we compare the donation rate in a control condition — in which
participants are not informed about the study — with the donation rate in the No Excuse condition,
which allows us to identify the joint effect of first- and second-order persuasion. We find that this
joint effect is small relative to the “excuse effect.” This again suggests a quantitatively important
role of commonly known excuses relative to the direct and indirect effects of persuasion. Moreover,
the effect is driven by participants who live in more liberal areas, suggesting that participants
more strongly require excuses when their audience is likely to disapprove of their actions. Evidence
from a number of different exercises, and a successful replication of our findings with a more
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subtle treatment manipulation using a representative sample of 1,373 respondents in October 2020,
suggests that experimenter demand effects are not driving our results.
Anti-immigrant expression often takes place over social media, a setting where one’s audience
generally consists of friends, family members, and acquaintances. While individuals connected on
social media often hold similar political beliefs, extreme anti-immigrant views may be unpopular
even among the followers of those holding such views. These individuals may therefore strategically
share rationales, such as inflammatory news articles or viral video clips, in order to justify their
anti-immigrant positions.
Experiment 3 investigates this possibility. The design is similar in concept to that of Experi-
ment 2, but allows us to examine the strategic use of excuses in a natural setting — social media
— and with a commonly-used rationale — an anti-immigrant video clip from Fox News. We cre-
ate an application via Twitter’s Application Program Interface that enables us to study people’s
willingness to post an extreme anti-immigrant statement on their social media accounts.9 Specif-
ically, we recruit a sample of 517 Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents with Twitter
accounts. All respondents watch a clip from Tucker Carlson Tonight, one of the most popular cable
news shows in the country, arguing that non-citizens are significantly more likely to commit violent
crimes than citizens. They are then given the opportunity to post a petition to immediately deport
all illegal immigrants in the country on their Twitter account. As in Experiment 2, our experi-
ment holds fixed first- and second-order persuasion, varying only the availability of the “excuse”:
whether a respondent will think that followers reading the post will believe the respondent had
been exposed to the video before or after posting the anti-immigrant content. The excuse effect
is once again statistically significant and and economically meaningful: participants in the Excuse
condition are 17 percentage points (34%) more likely to authorize the donation than participants
in the No Excuse condition (p < 0.001). This large effect size highlights that compelling rationales,
such as those provided by prominent public figures, can substantially increase intolerant expression
vis-a-vis a natural audience on social media. Such rationales may therefore serve to increase intol-
erant behavior not only through their persuasive appeal, but also by providing excuses for people
to express stigmatized views.
9Importantly, we design our experiment to non-deceptively elicit respondents’ revealed preferences for making
such a post in a natural way without actually leading them to post; see Section 4 for details and Appendix C for a
discussion of the ethical considerations underlying the design.
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Related Literature Our paper builds on theoretical literature on the effects of social image
concerns on economic and moral decision-making. Most closely related to our work is Bénabou
et al. (2018), which presents a theoretical model of the production and circulation of arguments
justifying actions on the basis of morality. We also build on a growing empirical literature studying
the effect of social image concerns on political and economic outcomes.10 Relative to existing work,
a key contribution of this paper is to show that people can strategically use information to influence
how others will assess their motives. In contrast to previous work showing that one’s beliefs about
others’ opinions matter for public behavior, we show that one’s beliefs about how others will update
about one’s own motives also have significant effects on one’s willingness to express an otherwise-
stigmatized view. We therefore highlight the importance of commonly known rationales, which can
be created by prominent public figures and the media. Our paper is thus related to laboratory
evidence on strategic communication used to justify public actions (Foerster and van der Weele,
2021).
Our work also relates to a growing literature on social norms governing public behavior —
in particular, to work examining how these norms can quickly change (Kuran, 1997; Bursztyn et
al., 2020a,b). Our work is similar in that it examines how previously-stigmatized public behavior
becomes socially acceptable, but it differs both conceptually and in its implications for equilibrium
expression. Conceptually, we disentangle second-order beliefs (beliefs about others’ views) from
third-order beliefs (beliefs about others’ beliefs about one’s own views) and show that the latter
mechanism enables excuses to increase the public expression of intolerant positions by reducing
the extent to which public expression is informative of private attitudes. Practically, the excuse
mechanism allows even views that are privately unpopular — such as conspiracy theories or extreme
statements about certain minorities, such as that studied in Experiment 311) — to be publicly
expressed in equilibrium. The social norms mechanism examined in Bursztyn et al. (2020a) and
Bursztyn et al. (2020b), in contrast, rests upon these stigmatized views already being widely held.
Of course, the two mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. For example, intolerant views may initially
emerge among only a small segment of the population, which may use excuses to lower the cost of
publicly expressing these views to the rest of society. As a consequence of this public expression,
10These outcomes include moral behavior, as in Ariely et al. 2009; Lacetera and Macis 2010; Ewers and Zimmer-
mann 2015; voting, as in DellaVigna et al. 2017; tax evasion, as in Perez-Truglia and Troiano 2018; Besley et al. 2019;
identity choice, as in Jia and Persson 2019; campaign donations, as in Perez-Truglia and Cruces 2017; educational
investments, as in Bursztyn and Jensen 2015; and labor market choices, as in Bursztyn et al. 2017.
11“Americans broadly support legal status for immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally as children.” Krogstad,
Jens Manuel, Pew, June 17, 2020.
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others may then be privately persuaded. An event that serves to aggregate this private information
— for example, an election, as studied in Bursztyn et al. (2020b) — can then bring previously-fringe
views into the mainstream. Thus, excuses may thus be essential in facilitating the initial growth of
stigmatized views by enabling them to be publicly expressed. More generally, our work connects to
a vast literature on the effects of media and propaganda on anti-minority behavior (e.g. Yanagizawa-
Drott 2014; Enikolopov and Petrova 2015; Adena et al. 2015) by proposing one potential mechanism
by which these effects might operate and demonstrating its quantitative importance in a natural
setting.12
Several laboratory studies show that “moral wiggle room” can have substantial effects on behav-
ior.13 Because decisions in these settings are anonymous, these findings can be understood through
a behavioral model of self-signaling, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2011a): people exploit moral wiggle
room to take self-serving actions while convincing themselves that they are not acting selfishly.
Our work differs from this literature in that we are interested in the role of excuses in justifying
actions vis-a-vis others — we hold the self-excuse channel constant by exposing respondents to the
same private information set — and we examine the implications of commonly-known rationales
both for the interpretation of intolerant actions and for the decision to take these actions. Rela-
tive to existing work, our experiment on social media leverages a more natural outcome, people’s
willingness to tweet, and a more natural audience, people’s actual social media followers.14
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present an experiment
examining how the availability of an excuse affects the interpretation of xenophobic actions. In
Section 3, we present an experiment showing that commonly known rationales increase xenophobic
expression. In Section 4, we present an experiment examining the use of misleading narratives as
excuses on social media. We discuss policy implications and conclude in Section 5. The Appendix
includes a simple theoretical framework, additional tables and figures, a discussion of a motivating
12Our work also connects to a literature on populist political movements (e.g. Norris and Inglehart 2019, Acemoglu
et al. 2013). Authoritarian populists — characterized by Müller (2016) as fundamentally anti-pluralist — are often
highly effective in generating common knowledge of rationales justifying exclusionary policies targeting minority
groups. For example, in Italy, populist leader Matteo Salvini justified strong anti-immigration policies by claiming
that Italy was facing an “invasion” of alleged African mafia bosses.
13See, for example, Dana et al. (2007); Golman et al. (2017, 2016); Lazear et al. (2012); Hamman et al. (2010);
Saccardo and Serra-Garcia (2020); Exley (2016); Cunningham and de Quidt (2016).
14A seminal contribution in psychology is Langer et al. (1978), which finds that subjects waiting to make Xerox
copies were more likely to comply with a request when it was justified by a reason, irrespective of whether the
reason was “bad” (“Excuse me...May I use the Xerox machine, because I have to make copies?”) or “good” (“Excuse
me...May I use the Xerox machine, because I’m in a rush). Langer et al. (1978) interprets this as evidence for the
“mindlessness of ostensibly thoughtful action”, arguing that people have simply been conditioned to comply with
requests accompanied by justifications. Related work in psychology includes Bandura et al. (1996), Bandura et al.
(2001), and Shalvi et al. (2015).
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survey, and the full set of experimental instructions.
2 Excuses and Interpreting Xenophobic Expression
We begin by examining how the availability of a rationale changes how an audience interprets the
decision to donate to Fund the Wall, an organization that seeks to fund the proposed US–Mexico
border wall.15 We are particularly interested in how excuses affect judgment vis-a-vis an audience
that disapproves of the action, as this is precisely the audience before which an agent may require
an excuse, and we thus focus on Democrats.16
In our framework, a person may donate to Fund the Wall for two reasons. First, they may be
intolerant. Alternatively, they may have been persuaded to donate after being exposed to the anti-
immigrant rationale.17 Others observe whether or not the person donated, then use this information
to make an inference about the person’s underlying motivations.18 In Experiment 1, we study how
the audience’s inference is affected by the availability of an excuse.
2.1 Sample
We conducted Experiment 1 in partnership with the survey company Luc.id, a widely used online
survey panel provider (Wood and Porter, 2019). We recruited a sample of 3,047 Democrats in
February 2020.19 Participants were directed to our survey on the online platform Qualtrics. Only
participants who were over the age of 18, resided in the United States, indicated their consent
to participate, and passed a simple test of attention were allowed to proceed. Our sample of
respondents is broadly representative of Democrats in the United States (Appendix Table B1) and
15All survey instruments are available in Appendix D.
16As of January 2019, 6 percent of Democrats or Democratic leaners favored “substantially expanding the wall”,
compared to 82 percent of Republicans or Republican leaners (Pew, 2019).
17Differences in persuasion may arise because some people are more gullible than others, and thus the posterior
probability that these gullible types assign to the event that the story is true shifts further from their prior than
that of non-gullible types. Alternatively, these differences may arise because some people will be more affected if
the state of the world implied by the rationale is true, and thus they are more willing to donate than other agents
even if they assign the same probability to the event that the rationale is true as other agents. Said differently,
differences in persuasion may arise from differences in belief updating or from differences in payoffs. The definition
of persuasion that we adopt—“influencing behavior via provision of information” (Kamenica, 2019)—applies to both
possibilities, and thus we refer to “persuadable agents” without further distinguishing between the two potential
underlying mechanisms.
18See Appendix A for a simple model that formalizes this discussion.
19In our pre-registration, we specified that in some specifications, we would pool data from a pilot (N = 2, 019)
with the data from the main experiment. The pilot instrument was virtually identical to the instrument used in the
main experiment. We report both unpooled and pooled specifications.
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well-balanced on observables across treatment arms (Appendix Table B2). Experimental procedures
and analyses were pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry.
2.2 Experimental design
Figure 1 outlines the structure of Experiment 1. We tell all respondents about a recent study (Lott,
2018) which finds that “undocumented immigrants are at least 142% more likely to be convicted
of a crime than other Arizonans ... they also tend to commit more serious crimes and serve 10.5%
longer sentences, are more likely to be classified as dangerous, and are 45% more likely to be gang
members than U.S. citizens.”20 We also truthfully tell our respondents that a number of sources
(including a researcher affiliated with the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank) have recently
challenged some of the study’s methods, claiming that errors in analysis invalidate its results.21.
We then tell participants that we conducted a project on political and social attitudes in the United
States earlier in the year, and that respondents to this previous study were given an opportunity to
authorize a $1 donation to Fund the Wall: a potentially stigmatized expression of anti-immigrant
beliefs. We inform participants that we have matched them with one of these respondents, and
that this respondent chose to authorize the donation. Respondents in the Excuse condition are
(truthfully) told that their matched respondent was informed about the study before deciding
whether or not to authorize the donation to Fund the Wall, while respondents in the No Excuse
condition are (truthfully) told that their matched respondent was not informed about the study
before making their donation decision.
Measuring type inference After learning whether or not their matched respondent knew about
the study, all participants respond to the following open-ended question: “Why do you think your
matched respondent chose to donate to Fund the Wall?” As we discuss in Section 2.3, these open-
ended responses form the raw data for our first measure of type inference; we employ text analysis
to systematically analyze the open-ended responses. Participants are then cross-randomized into
20This study has been widely covered by the media, including The Washington Times, National Review, and Fox
News, and has been repeatedly cited by Trump administration officials. For example, in a January 2018 speech on
“national security and immigration priorities of the administration,” then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions claimed
that the study proved that “tens of thousands of crimes have been committed in this country that would never have
happened if our immigration laws were enforced and respected like they ought to be” (see footnote 5).
21In order to ensure that our respondents are not misinformed, we debrief them at the end of the study and provide
them with a meta-analysis summarizing the work on the effects of immigration on crime (Ousey and Kubrin, 2018).
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one of two conditions: “tolerance” and “gullibility”.22,23 Participants in the “tolerance” condition
are told that their matched respondent completed the “Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale,” a “short
questionnaire measuring tolerance toward foreign values and traditions,” before making their do-
nation decisions. Participants in the “gullibility” condition are told that their matched respondent
completed the “Gullibility Scale,” a “short questionnaire which measures how easily people are
manipulated by evidence from untrustworthy sources,” before making their donation decisions. All
participants are asked to guess their respondent’s score; we incentivize this guess by informing
them that if they correctly guess the score, they will be entered into a lottery for a $50 Amazon
gift card.24
2.3 Main results
Empirical strategy To identify the effect of the excuse on respondents’ inference about the
matched respondent’s type, we estimate the following empirical specification:
yi = α0 + α1Excusei + εi, (1)
where Excusei is an indicator taking value 1 for participants in the Excuse condition and value 0 in
the No Excuse condition. yi is our participant’s belief about the matched respondent’s type. We
employ robust standard errors throughout.
Main findings We begin by using text analysis to measure how participants respond to the open-
ended question “Why do you think your matched respondent chose to donate to Fund the Wall?”
22Of course, as described above, gullibility is only one of a set of potential reasons for donating after being exposed
to information suggesting immigrants commit more crimes; alternative reasons include lower tolerance for crime,
higher levels of risk aversion, etc. We focus on gullibility in our experiment because it is (arguably) the most natural
“second type,” because it was the most frequent reason cited in our pilot results, and because it is most consistently
coded.
23We measure type inference using a “between” design (in which each respondent is asked only about a single
dimension) rather than a “within” design (in which respondents are asked about both dimensions). We employ a
between design in order to minimize experimenter demand effects and to avoid order effects (Haaland et al., 2020).
24The previous study respondents with whom Experiment 2 subjects were matched completed a survey very
similar in structure to our Experiment 1 survey, but the two surveys were not precisely the same. In particular, it
was important that Experiment 2 subjects believe that their matched respondents completed the scale before learning
about the Lott study and before making their donation decision, such that subjects’ inferences about their matched
respondents’ scores were not biased by subjects believing that learning about the Lott study changed their matched
respondents scores. However, administering these scales in this manner to participants in Experiment 1 might have
created significant demand effects, compromising the validity of our findings. To avoid deception, we thus ran a small
auxiliary survey before we ran Experiment 2, and we matched Experiment 2 subjects with participants from this
auxiliary survey.
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The advantage of this approach is that we can directly measure what comes to respondents’ minds
rather than drawing their attention to the particular dimensions we are interested in. Measuring
type inference through analyzing open-ended text responses may thus better capture the natural
process of inference than directly asking about perceptions of tolerance or gullibility.25
We began with five “seed words” for each type. For (in)tolerance, we chose racist, biased,
xenophobic, intolerant, and prejudiced. For gullibility, we chose convinced, persuaded, gullible, naive,
and sucker. We added all “most relevant” synonyms for these words, as classified by the website
www.thesaurus.com. In order to capture different parts of speech, we then stemmed all words in
our list (e.g., xenophobic→ xenophob, gullible→ gullib), for a total of 23 intolerance-related stems
and 30 gullibility-related stems (Gentzkow et al., 2019).
We then define two indicator variables — one variable that takes value 1 if the respondent
uses an intolerance-related stem and 0 otherwise, and another variable that takes value 1 if the
respondent uses a gullibility-related stem and 0 otherwise — and estimate treatment effects on the
probability that the respondent uses at least one word in each list.26 To eliminate potential degrees
of freedom for analysis, we pre-specified this entire procedure, including the list of stems and the
code file used for analysis.
Figure 2 displays results from our text-based type inference. Participants in the Excuse condi-
tion are 7 percentage points less likely to use a stem related to intolerance when describing their
matched respondent’s motive, compared to a mean of 17 percent among participants in the No
Excuse condition (p < 0.001). These same participants are also 3 percentage points more likely to
use words related to gullibility (p < 0.001), relative to a mean of 7 percent among participants in
the No Excuse condition.27 These are substantial effect sizes, which highlight that the availability
of a rationale strongly changes people’s inference about their matched respondent’s motives. The
fact that the effect on intolerance is larger than the effect on gullibility is consistent with the fact
that gullibility is only one of several possible “second types” to which respondents might be sub-
stituting. Columns 1–3 of Table 1 display results in regression form and demonstrate robustness to
the inclusion of demographic and partisan controls.
Figure 2 also displays results from our structured belief measures. Participants who believe their
25Because respondents in both the No Excuse and Excuse conditions see the same question, our approach also
mitigates concerns about experimenter demand. We discuss experimenter demand in greater depth in Section 2.4.
26These two outcomes are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive; responses that contain both an
intolerance-related stem and a gullibility-related stem will have both intolerance and gullibility indicators equal to
one, whereas responses that contain neither type of stem will have both indicators equal to zero. Thus, our results
are unbiased even if participants perceive a nonzero correlation between intolerance and gullibility.
27We were intentionally conservative when choosing stem words in order to minimize the rate of false positives.
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matched respondent had an excuse rated their respondent 0.13 standard deviations lower on the
intolerance scale (p < 0.001), and 0.32 standard deviations higher on the gullibility scale (p < 0.001).
As with the text analysis measure, effects are similar in the pilot and in the pre-registered main
experiment, are robust to the inclusion of control variables, and are precisely estimated. Table 2
displays results in regression form and demonstrates robustness to the inclusion of demographic
and partisan controls. To further validate our two measures of type inference, we show in Table B3
that they are highly correlated: on average, a respondent who uses a word related to intolerance
(gullibility) when describing the matched respondent’s motive rates the matched respondent as half
a standard deviation more intolerant (gullible) than a respondent who does not use such a word.
As a final measure of beliefs, we use a Support Vector Machine regression to predict participants’
ratings of their partners on the intolerance and gullibility scales based upon their open-ended text
responses. This measure aims to exploit all information given in the open-responses for predicting
the subsequent belief measures; importantly, because all participants completed the open-ended
responses before seeing the scale, we can include participants assigned to the gullibility condition
when evaluating effects on intolerance, and we can include participants assigned to the intolerance
condition when evaluating effects on gullibility.28 We then estimate treatment effects on these
predicted scores. Unlike our word-counting exercise, this approach is insensitive to the set of
keywords chosen and is thus a more disciplined procedure to measure perceptions of bias and
gullibility expressed in participants’ open-ended responses. Columns 4–6 of Table 1 display these
results in regression form and confirm that our treatment has a statistically and economically
significant effect on perceived motives.
Taken together, our evidence suggests that when judging others’ motives, people believe that
those who donated with an excuse are more persuadable and less intolerant than those who donated
without an excuse.
2.4 Ruling out alternative explanations
Demand effects One potential concern regarding the validity of our estimated treatment effects
is that respondents across different treatment conditions hold different beliefs about the exper-
imenter’s expectations, and that these beliefs drive our findings. Despite recent evidence that
respondents are not elastic to explicit signals of the experimenter’s expectations in online surveys
28We employed a radial basis function kernel in the SVR, though in practice the results are insensitive to other
choices of parameters. This final exercise was not pre-registered.
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(de Quidt et al., 2018), suggesting a limited quantitative importance of demand effects in the
context of our experiment, we provide direct evidence on beliefs about the purpose of the study.
We measured respondents’ beliefs about the purpose of the experiment at the end of Experiment
1 using an open-ended question: “If you had to guess, what was the purpose of this study?” To
examine whether respondents in the different treatment conditions hold different beliefs about
the purpose of the study, we employ machine learning techniques to classify these text responses.
In particular, a Support Vector Machine classifier trained to predict treatment status given the
participant’s response cannot predict whether respondents were assigned to the Excuse or No
Excuse condition better than chance (Table B4).29 This suggests that the treatment does not
significantly affect respondents’ perceptions about the purpose of the study.30
Differential attrition Could differential attrition across treatment arms explain our findings?
Attrition rates in Experiment 1 are virtually identical among respondents in the Excuse and No
Excuse conditions (p = 0.23) and neither political affiliation nor any other demographic variable
systematically predicts differential attrition across treatment arms (Table B5 in the Appendix).
2.5 Do people dislike the intolerant more than the gullible?
A key assumption in our model is that the social image cost of being perceived as intolerant is
higher than the social image cost of being perceived as gullible.31 In an additional auxiliary exper-
iment, we confirm that this assumption is reasonable.32 In particular, we recruit a representative
sample of Democrats (the same population as in Experiment 1), and we inform them that they have
been matched either with another respondent who scored above average on The Gullibility Scale
(gullibility condition) or below average on The Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale (intolerance condi-
tion). We then give them the opportunity to authorize a $1 donation to their matched respondent.
Consistent with our assumption, we observe significantly higher donations to matched partners
with high gullibility than to matched partners with high intolerance (see Appendix Figure B1 and
Appendix Table B6).
29We employed a radial basis function kernel in the SVR, though in practice the results are insensitive to other
choices of parameters.
30In Section 3.2, we present evidence that our classifier is sufficiently sensitive to detect differences in stated beliefs
when they are present.
31For simplicity, we assume in our model that there is no direct social image cost of being perceived as gullible.
We can relax this assumption without changing any of the key results, so long as the direct social image cost of being
perceived as intolerant remains higher than the direct social image cost of being perceived as gullible.
32A copy of the experimental instructions is available in Appendix Section G.
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3 Excuses and Xenophobic Expression
Experiment 1 demonstrates that subjects are less likely to ascribe xenophobic behavior to intol-
erance when an excuse is available. Furthermore, the auxiliary experiment demonstrates that
subjects are less spiteful toward gullible types than intolerant types. These results raise the ques-
tion of whether people who hold intolerant views strategically use excuses to lower the social cost of
publicly expressing these views.33 We examine this question in Experiment 2 in the same context as
in Experiment 1: anti-immigrant expression justified by claims that immigrants disproportionately
commit violent crimes.
3.1 Experiment 2: sample and experimental design
We again worked with Luc.id to recruit 3,728 self-reported Republicans and Independents. In some
specifications, we supplement this data with approximately 716 Republicans and Independents from
a pilot experiment with Luc.id, also conducted in January 2020, that had nearly identical wording.34
In other specifications, we additionally pool with data from a replication and robustness check (1373
Republicans and Independents) conducted in October 2020.35 Participants were directed to our
survey on the online platform Qualtrics; only participants who were over the age of 18, resided
in the United States, indicated their consent to participate, and passed a simple test of attention
were allowed to proceed.36 Our sample of respondents is broadly representative of Independents
and Republicans in the United States (Appendix Table B7) and is well-balanced on observables
across treatment arms (Appendix Table B8). We pre-registered all experimental procedures and
analyses for the main experiment. Figure 3 outlines the structure of Experiment 2. Given its focus,
Experiment 2 involved a number of ethical considerations; we discuss these considerations briefly
in this section, but outline them in greater detail in Appendix C.
Information: Lott study After completing a series of demographic questions, respondents are
assigned to one of three different treatment conditions: an Excuse condition, a No Excuse condition,
and a Control condition. Respondents in the Excuse and No Excuse conditions receive information
about the Lott study; respondents in the Control condition do not learn about the study.
33See Appendix A for a simple model of this behavior.
34We pre-registered reporting both results pooling pilot data with our main data and results with our main data
alone.
35We describe this replication in greater detail in Section 3.2.
36All survey instruments are available in Appendix E.
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Donation decisions To minimize experimenter demand concerns, we truthfully tell our respon-
dents that we will randomly select one of two organizations — an anti-immigrant organization
(Fund the Wall) and a pro-immigration organization (Texas Civil Rights Project) — and the re-
spondents will have the opportunity to authorize a $1 donation to this organization.37 In practice,
we randomized almost all respondents to Fund the Wall to maximize statistical power for our
comparison of interest.
Visibility manipulation Our treatment hinges upon respondents’ decisions being publicly ob-
servable. We ask respondents to consent to us accessing their name, city, and operating system from
the survey provider (which confirmed that they would provide us with this data subject to partic-
ipant consent) and give respondents the option to terminate the survey if they do not consent.38
We inform respondents that once the Lott study is published in a reputable academic journal, we
will post the results from the survey, including their individual donation decision, on our study
website.39
We also inform our respondents that “As researchers, we believe it is important to communicate
our findings about political and social attitudes in [City of respondent] to the public”.40 We then
inform our respondents that “we will work with major news organizations in [City of respondent]
with both a liberal and conservative viewership to publicize our website through newspaper and
website articles”, and “we will also promote our website via Facebook ads to [City of respondent]
residents”. This generates a plausible social cost for acting in a way that will be stigmatized in the
respondent’s area.41
Varying the availability of the excuse Our main object of interest is to identify the excuse
effect. This is complicated by the fact that providing information to respondents may affect their
behavior through two alternative channels other than the availability of the excuse. First, the
information might be directly persuasive, leading more respondents to donate because their private
37Respondents are explicitly informed that their own survey reward will be unaffected by their choice of whether
or not to donate: they are simply authorizing the researchers to make a donation on their behalf.
38Because participants consent before exposure to the treatment, any resulting attrition should not bias our
estimates within the population who completes the survey.
39At the time of writing, the Lott study has not yet been published, and thus the donation decisions are not yet
online.
40We used participants’ IP address to capture and display their current location (i.e. their city). The IP addresses
were subsequently deleted to protect respondents’ privacy.
41If/when the study has been published and the website has been created, we plan to publicize the website through
Facebook Advertisements and by disseminating our working paper to news organizations. In line with instructions
to respondents, the website will only be created once the Lott study has been published.
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views have changed. Second, even if the information does not persuade respondents, respondents
might believe that their audience will be persuaded by the study’s description on the website, leading
respondents to expect lower social stigma from donating and thus increasing donation rates. We
thus design our experiment to rule out these competing effects. To hold fixed the first mechanism,
all respondents in the Excuse and No Excuse condition receive the same information about the
study. To hold fixed the second mechanism, we show respondents in the Excuse and No Excuse
conditions screenshots of our website, clearly indicating that all website visitors will be informed
about the study.
The key experimental treatment thus cleanly varies the availability of an excuse for donating.
In the Excuse condition, we inform respondents that “Website visitors will know that you knew
about the results of Dr. Lott’s study,” giving respondents an excuse to donate (i.e. believing, based
on the findings of the Lott study, that illegal immigrants commit substantially more crime than
US citizens). Respondents also see a screenshot of the website, which clearly states that “All
participants were told about Dr. Lott’s study.” Thus, respondents in the Excuse condition expect
that their audience will know they learned about the study before donating.
Conceptually, in the No Excuse condition, we would like to show respondents a website screen-
shot stating that “No participants were told about Dr. Lott’s study”. However, because these
participants did in fact learn about the study, such a screenshot would be deceptive. Instead, we
exploit the fact that Lott’s study had not yet been published in an academic journal (a fact about
which we explicitly informed all respondents when describing the website). In particular, we show
respondents a website screenshot stating that “We surveyed respondents earlier this year before
Dr. Lott’s study was published.” In the survey, we write that “the website states that you were
surveyed before the study was published and does not mention that you were shown an early sum-
mary of the study’s findings.”42 Respondents in this condition thus believe that their audience will
believe that they (the respondents) had no information excusing their decision to donate to Fund
the Wall.
Control condition We also include a Control condition in which neither the respondent nor the
audience learns about the Lott study. This condition allows us to estimate the combined effects of
direct persuasion and anticipated persuasion of the audience, as we describe below.
42As discussed in Section 3.2, we replicate our findings using a different and more subtle treatment manipulation.
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3.2 Experiment 2: main results
Empirical strategy To identify the joint effects of direct persuasion and anticipated persuasion
of the audience (i.e. the direct persuasive effect of learning about the Lott study in addition to the
indirect effect of learning that one’s audience has learned about the Lott study and may thus be
more likely to approve of the donation), we compare the Control condition with the No Excuse
condition. To identify the excuse effect, we compare the No Excuse condition to the Excuse
condition. This design thus allows us to benchmark the excuse effect against the combined effect
of first- and second-order persuasion. Our main specification of interest is given as follows:
yi = β0 + β1Excusei + β2Controli + εi (2)
where yi is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent authorized the donation to Fund the
Wall and 0 otherwise; Excusei is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent was assigned to the
Excuse condition and 0 otherwise; and Controli is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent was
assigned to the Control condition and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is thus the No Excuse
condition. We employ robust standard errors throughout our analysis.
Main findings Table 3 and Figure 4 display the main findings of Experiment 2. We find a large
and statistically significant effect on respondents’ willingness to authorize a donation to Fund the
Wall: respondents in the Excuse condition are 6.3 percentage points more likely to authorize the
donation than respondents in the No Excuse condition. This effect is highly statistically significant
(p < 0.001) and large relative to a control condition mean of 48.8 percentage points. Effect sizes are
almost identical in our pre-specified main study, our pilot study, and a replication several months
later.
In contrast to the Excuse vs. No Excuse comparison, respondents in the No Excuse condition
are only 0.007 percentage points more likely to authorize a donation than respondents in the
control condition, suggesting that the combined effects of first- and second-order persuasion are
small. Relatively small persuasion effects are in line with other information provision experiments
in the immigration domain, which typically find relatively small or null effects on behavior and
stated preferences (Alesina et al., 2019; Hopkins et al., 2019; Grigorieff et al., 2020). Thus, small
effects of anticipated persuasion are consistent with agents holding accurate expectations about
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whether their audience will be persuaded.
Given the small joint effect of persuasion and the anticipated persuasion of the audience, what
might explain the large excuse effect we observe? First, agents may simply hold incorrect higher-
order beliefs: in particular, they may believe that their audience is more likely to believe that they
have been persuaded by the information. Alternatively, they may predict that social rewards or
sanctions associated with being perceived as intolerant are not linear in the probability that one
is intolerant: for example, they may believe that as long as it appears that there is some small
probability that they are not intolerant (i.e. because they were exposed to the study and may have
been persuaded), their audience will refrain from socially sanctioning them (“innocent until proven
guilty”). To preserve analytic tractability and convey our intuition as simply as possible, we do
not formally model either of these channels.
Heterogeneity by local vote shares An implication of our model is that the audience’s compo-
sition — the share of tolerant vs. intolerant agents — should affect donation decisions by changing
the perceived judgment associated with donating. Because we informed respondents that we would
promote the website (on which their individual donation decision would be posted) within their
geographical area, we might expect that controlling for the respondents’ own private views, respon-
dents in areas with a greater fraction of Republicans should be less sensitive to the availability of
a rationale than respondents in areas with a lower fraction of Republicans, since Republicans are
likely to approve of the decision to donate to Fund the Wall even in the absence of a rationale.43 We
thus pre-registered investigating heterogeneity by the 2016 Republican vote share of respondents’
county, which we do by estimating the following specification:
yi = β0 + β1Excusei + β2Controli + β3Excusei × Rep sharei + β4Controli × Rep sharei
+ β5Rep sharei + εi
(3)
Table 4 displays the results, revealing striking heterogeneity by the Republican vote share of re-
spondents’ counties. Although the heterogeneity is only statistically significant when we control for
individuals’ demographic characteristics, the effect is large in magnitude: a one standard deviation
increase in the Republican vote share of a respondent’s county is associated with halving the mag-
nitude of the excuse effect. These results should not be interpreted as a causal effect of respondents’
43Of course, it is possible that Republicans care less about the opinions of Democrats than that of fellow Repub-
licans, which would weaken the heterogeneity results we examine.
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audiences — it may be, for example, that Republicans in Democratic areas feel greater need to
signal their support for the study by publicly donating — but the pattern is consistent with our
intuition that the excuse effect should be larger when the share of agents who privately approve of
the action is smaller.
Robustness experiment The excuse effect, though potentially large in magnitude, is difficult to
cleanly identify given the need to hold both first-order and second-order persuasion constant. The
instructions of Experiment 2 were thus relatively explicit: participants were directly informed about
their audience’s information sets and were reminded about this information when making their
decision, thus ensuring that they fully understood the instructions. Yet one concern is that these
instructions, by making the higher-order belief mechanism salient, induced experimenter demand
effects that biased our estimated treatment effects. In October 2020, we conducted an additional
robustness experiment with 1,373 Republicans, which used a much leaner set of instructions and
which made the issue of higher-order beliefs much less salient.44 In this experiment, we did not show
participants any screenshots or illustrations; we did not explicitly tell them what their audience
was likely to believe about whether they had seen the study prior to making the donation; and we
considerably shortened the survey. We omitted the Control condition, given our primary interest
in the comparison between Excuse and No Excuse.
Columns 4–6 of Table 3 report our estimates. We find similar and statistically significant
treatment effects (though of slightly smaller magnitudes) using this much leaner set of experimental
instructions. Thus, the results of this robustness experiment not only mitigate concerns that
experimenter demand effects drove our original findings but they also bolster their external validity:
despite being conducted almost a year later in a substantially different economic and political
situation (in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and an economic recession, just a few weeks
before Election Day), we once again find significant evidence for the excuse mechanism. We also
replicate the heterogeneity by Republican vote share (Columns 4–6 of Table 4), which, if anything,
is stronger than in the original experiment.
Demand effects: further discussion A priori, it seems plausible that showing participants
information about the Lott study may induce demand effects and thus affect donation rates. Even
44We targeted 1,426 complete responses, the sample size needed for 80% power to detect an effect size of the same
magnitude as the effect size estimated in the main experiment and pilot (Column 3 of Table 3). Attrition rates were
slightly greater than in previous rounds, resulting in a slightly smaller sample. See Appendix F for the experimental
instructions.
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if such demand effects are present, however, they will not bias our main comparison of interest
(Excuse vs. No Excuse), given that participants in both treatment arms are shown identical
information about the study. Another concern is that the treatment manipulation of beliefs about
the audience’s information set induced differential experimenter demand effects. In addition to
conducting the robustness experiment described above, we address this concern through a number
of additional exercises.
As in Experiment 1, we measured respondents’ beliefs about the purpose of the experiment
at the end of Experiment 2 using an open-ended question. As before, we use a Support Vector
Machine classifier to predict treatment status given the participant’s response. Employing 75
percent of our sample as a training set and the remaining 25 percent as a test set, we show that we
cannot predict treatment status better than chance when distinguishing between the Excuse and
No Excuse conditions (Table B11). However, we can predict assignment to the control condition
substantially better than chance (Table B11), which highlights that respondents in the control
condition hold different beliefs from respondents in the Excuse and No Excuse condition. Given
that the control condition differs significantly from the Excuse and No Excuse conditions in that
control respondents do not learn about the Lott study, this difference is to be expected; we view this
result as validation for our method, as it demonstrates that we would in principle detect differences
in perceived purpose between the Excuse and No Excuse conditions if such differences were present.
In addition to the machine-learning exercise, we also hired two independent research assistants
to hand-code the responses to the open-ended purpose question. Table B10 in the Appendix shows
that the majority of our respondents believed that we wanted to study the effects of information on
anti-immigrant sentiment or participant’s willingness to have their decisions posted on the website.
Fewer than 1 percent of our sample correctly guessed the true purpose of our experiment (Column 1).
Table B10 also shows that on almost all of the dimensions we code, beliefs about the purpose of the
study do not significantly differ between the Excuse and No Excuse conditions. The exception is
Social Image (Column 3): respondents in the Excuse condition are 2 percentage points more likely
than respondents in the No Excuse condition to believe that the study was about whether people
were willing to publicly express political views (p = 0.038). Although statistically significant, this
difference is small in magnitude and cannot explain our effect sizes. Reassuringly, respondents were
no more likely to believe that the experimenters were biased in the Excuse condition than in the
No Excuse condition (Column 6, p = 0.994). As suggested by the results of the machine learning
exercise described previously, we do find significant differences in perceived purpose between the
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control condition and the No Excuse condition and also between the control condition and the
Excuse condition. This is likely due to the fact that we provided respondents in the No Excuse
and Excuse conditions information suggesting that undocumented immigrants commit more crimes
than US citizens (i.e. the Lott study), while we did not provide any such information to respondents
in the control condition. However, these differences do not affect our main comparison of interest
(No Excuse vs. Excuse).
Finally, heterogeneous treatment effects by the county-level Republican vote share provide addi-
tional suggestive evidence against experimenter demand effects driving our findings. In particular,
for demand effects to explain our treatment effects, we would require that — controlling for re-
spondents’ own characteristics, including their political affiliation — respondents in counties with
a lower Republican vote share are substantially more affected by latent experimenter demand ef-
fects (that both our hand-coding and our machine learning exercise fail to detect, and which are
induced even by the leaner set of experimental instructions used for the robustness experiment)
than respondents in counties with a higher Republican vote share. While not impossible, we view
this contingency as unlikely.
Differential attrition Could patterns of differential attrition explain the estimated treatment
effects in our data? We find no differential attrition among respondents in the Excuse versus No
Excuse condition (p = 0.47), and there is no evidence of differential attrition between different
subgroups (Table B12 in the Appendix). We do find a precisely estimated four percentage point
lower attrition rate among respondents in the control condition compared to respondents in the
Excuse condition and the No Excuse condition (p < 0.001), which may be explained by the greater
survey length of the Excuse and No Excuse versions of the survey. This does not affect our estimates
of the main effect of interest (No Excuse vs. Excuse), but may slightly bias the benchmark (Control
vs. No Excuse).
4 Xenophobic Expression on Social Media
Our final experiment examines the role of excuses in facilitating xenophobic expression in a more
natural setting — namely, on Twitter. Like Facebook and other social media platforms, Twitter
has struggled to curb the spread of misleading and fake content (Pennycook and Rand, 2019), a siz-
able fraction of which conveys anti-immigration narratives. Although academic studies concerning
immigration, such as the Lott study we examine in Experiments 1 and 2, occasionally do “go viral”
21
on Twitter, popular posts are more frequently statements or videos from politicians, journalists,
and television anchors. Thus, in this experiment, we examine a different “excuse”: a thirty-second
clip from one of the most popular cable news shows in the US, Tucker Carlson Tonight.45 In the
clip, Carlson draws upon statistics from the US Sentencing Commission to make the case that non-
citizens commit violent crimes at substantially higher rates than citizens.46 Relative to Experiment
2, therefore, Experiment 3 uses a more natural platform for xenophobic expression with a natural
audience — Twitter, rather than a website that we created — and uses an excuse more closely tied
to anti-immigrant narratives spread by prominent political figures and partisan media outlets that
motivated our investigation.
Experimentally examining how excuses shape the expression of anti-immigrant views on social
media is challenging from both a design and ethical perspective. The design challenges are much
the same as those in Experiment 2 — holding fixed first-order and second-order persuasion while
manipulating the availability of the excuse — with the added complication that we lose experimental
control when running the experiment on a social media platform rather than on our website.
Moreover, while the most natural revealed-preference outcome is whether or not a participant is
willing to post a public anti-immigrant statement on their account, we were unwilling to consider
designs that directly or indirectly increased public xenophobic expression. As with our previous
experiments, a related — and conflicting goal — was to avoid explicitly deceiving respondents. We
address these issues with an experimental design that (1) cleanly manipulates the availability of
an excuse while fixing other channels, (2) measures respondents’ revealed preference for making a
xenophobic post on their social media accounts, thus leveraging a more natural audience (3) avoids
increasing public xenophobic expression, and (4) avoids explicit deception. As for Experiment 2,
we discuss the ethical considerations briefly in this section but outline them in greater detail in
Appendix C.
As in Experiment 2, we restricted our sample to Republicans and Republican-leaning Indepen-
dents, and we pre-registered all experimental procedures. Given the need for respondents to (1)
have an active Twitter account and (2) to be willing to log into the survey using their Twitter
account, as described below, recruiting respondents to participate in this experiment was substan-
tially more difficult than for our previous experiments.47 Following the sampling strategy outlined
45Tucker Carlson has 4.4 million followers on Twitter.
46The clip is available at https://www.youtube.com/embed/SDdkkTLCUUQ?autoplay=1&amp;controls=0&amp;end=
166&amp;fs=0&amp;modestbranding=1&amp;start=113&amp;iv_load_policy=3.
47In order to maximize statistical power given the relatively small sample, we included only two conditions rather
than the three conditions in Experiment 2.
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in the pre-analysis plan, we recruited 517 respondents. Our sample is well-balanced on observables
across treatment arms (Appendix Table B13). Figure 5 outlines the structure of Experiment 3.
Experimental design Our design proceeds as follows.48 After completing a short attention
check, we ask respondents to log in to our survey using their Twitter account through “Tweetabil-
ity,” a Twitter application we created using Twitter’s Application Programming Interface (API)
that allows users to schedule Tweets to be posted on their account at a future date. We automati-
cally capture respondents’ Twitter handles after they log in. Respondents then watch the clip from
Tucker Carlson Tonight.
After watching the clip, respondents in the Excuse group, but not in the No Excuse group, are
provided a YouTube link to the video; as we discuss below, this difference in timing is key to our
experimental manipulation. We then ask respondents whether they would like to join a campaign to
immediately deport all illegal Mexican immigrants. The survey terminates for all respondents who
do not join the campaign. Those respondents in the No Excuse group who do join the campaign
are then provided the link to the video. All respondents who join are informed that part of the
campaign involves circulating a petition on Twitter calling for illegal Mexican immigrants to be
deported. We show them a screenshot of a Tweet to this effect and ask them if they are willing
to schedule the Tweet to be posted on their account. We inform respondents that all Tweets will
be posted all at once if/when we have surveyed people in all US counties (a strategy which, as we
explain to respondents, is often used in social media campaigns to make certain topics “trend” on
users’ timelines). In practice, because we target fewer respondents than the number of counties in
the US (3,141), the posts will never be made public.49
Respondents in the Excuse condition are asked whether they would like to authorize the fol-
lowing Tweet:
I have joined a campaign to immediately deport all illegal Mexican immigrants. Before I
joined the campaign, I received a link to this video on how illegals commit more crime:
y2ube/SDdkkTLCUUQ. Sign this petition to immediately deport all illegal Mexicans:
bit/ly/2OttyJ6
The Tweet is identical for respondents in the No Excuse condition, with one exception: the
second sentence begins “After I joined the campaign...”. Although all respondents in fact watched
48All survey instruments are available in Appendix H.
49See Appendix C for a discussion of the ethical considerations underlying the experimental design.
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the video before joining the campaign, it is true that respondents in the Excuse condition received
the link to the video before joining, while those in the No Excuse condition received the link after
joining.50 This difference in wording suggests to potential readers of the Tweet that respondents
in the Excuse group had been exposed to the video by Tucker Carlson before joining the campaign
— and thus had an “excuse” for joining — while respondents in the No Excuse group had not
been exposed before joining the campaign, and thus lacked such an excuse. We therefore vary the
excuse channel while fixing the persuasion channel (all respondents are exposed to the same video)
and the anticipated audience persuasion channel (all respondents know their Tweet’s readers will
be exposed to the video, since it is linked in the Tweet) across conditions.
Results Figure 6 displays the results, which we also show in regression table form in Table 5.
48% of respondents authorize the tweet in the No Excuse group, compared with 65% of respondents
in the Excuse group (p < 0.01).
This substantial effect underscores the relevance of the excuse mechanism in facilitating anti-
minority expression on social media. What might explain the larger effect size in this experiment
relative to Experiment 2 (both the original version and the replication)? First, Republicans and
Republican-leaning Independents who have active Twitter accounts and who consent to log in via
our app are non-representative of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents as a whole, and
they may be more sensitive to the availability of an excuse. Second, the position we consider in this
experiment — supporting the immediate deportation of all illegal immigrants — is more extreme,
and thus potentially more elastic to the excuse, than that considered in Experiment 2. This is
especially true because Experiment 3 took place after Trump’s electoral defeat in November 2020,
which may have increased the stigma surrounding the expression of anti-immigrant views. Third,
the only respondents who complete the entire survey in Experiment 3 are those who privately agree
with the sentiment expressed in the Tweet, and therefore our sample includes fewer inframarginal
respondents who never would have authorized the post in either condition. Fourth, respondents
may perceive the excuse in this experiment — a video from the most popular cable news host in the
country — as more compelling than that used in Experiment 2. Finally, respondents may believe
that more people will see their post on social media than the statement on the website described
50One potential concern is that providing a link to respondents in the Excuse condition, but not in the No Excuse
condition, induces differential selection into the campaign. Because we make the source of the clip obvious, we do not
view this as a plausible confound. Indeed, we find no statistically significant different in selection into the campaign
between groups (a 2.6 percentage point difference, p = 0.474), and our worst-case estimate under Lee (2009) bounds
remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
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in Experiment 2, and they may care more about their followers’ opinions than the audiences in
Experiment 2, leading to greater sensitivity to the availability of an excuse.
5 Policy Implications and Conclusion
Motivated by a global wave of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy, we study how commonly known
rationales to oppose immigration serve as excuses to justify anti-immigrant behavior. We use
three experiments to examine the mechanisms through which excuses facilitate the expression of
anti-immigration behavior, focusing on one of the most widely-cited justifications for reducing
immigration: the claim that immigrants commit crimes at vastly higher rates than citizens. In a
first experiment, we show that subjects perceive donors who had been exposed to an anti-immigrant
rationale as less biased against immigrants and more persuadable than donors who had not been
exposed. In a second experiment, we show that subjects who believe that their exposure to the
rationale will be publicly observable are substantially more likely to make the donation to an
anti-immigrant organization than subjects who believe that their exposure to the rationale will
remain private. In a final experiment, we show that subjects are more willing to publicly share
anti-minority content on their Twitter account when they know that they can use a clip from Fox
News as an excuse.
Our approach sheds light on a variety of political economy phenomena. For example, populist
rhetoric often seeks to generate common knowledge — or the perception of common knowledge —
of excuses. Müller (2016) argues that populist rhetoric is often characterized by appeals to the
beliefs or desires of the “people” or a “silent majority” — a group which often has little to no
basis in fact. For example, several commentators have highlighted Donald Trump’s tendency to
use phrases such as “People say ...” when discussing politically sensitive issues, and as Rosenblum
and Muirhead (2019) argue, this practice is common to a number of prominent populist politicians
around the world spanning the ideological spectrum. Such rhetoric generates the perception of
common knowledge of the excuse: by implying that fringe conspiracy theories are known to a large
group of people (and by appearing to endorse the theory themselves), populists seek to convey
that the excuse will be credible and thus effective.51 Closely related is the tendency to rely on
anecdotes — for instance, isolated cases of voter fraud — in order to argue certain phenomena are
widespread, ignoring statistics to the contrary. Also related is dog-whistling: “sending a message to
51This practice is, of course, also consistent with populists exploiting social learning channels in order to bolster
the persuasive power of their claims.
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certain potential supporters in such a way as to make it inaudible to others whom it might alienate
or deniable for still others who would find any explicit appeal along those lines offensive” (Goodin
and Saward, 2005), which has been used to describe the Republican Party’s “Southern Strategy”
to win white support in the South by appealing to racial tensions (Haney-López, 2014).52 As
with “people say” and related language, “dog-whistles” generate two types of excuses: one for the
politician vis-a-vis the public, and one for the politician’s supporters vis-a-vis others who disapprove
of the statement, allowing them to publicly support the politician and his or her policies without
incurring social stigma.53
Our findings are also relevant for the debate about the influence of fake and misleading news
on society. While studies suggest that the persuasive effect of fake and misleading news is limited
(Nyhan, 2018), Experiment 3 points to an alternative mechanism through which misleading news
can affect public expression. In particular, it can generate a “persuasion multiplier”: rationales
that plausibly persuade a small subset of the population and are commonly known to exist can
change public behavior among a much larger fraction of the population, increasing their willingness
to express otherwise-stigmatized views by increasing the effectiveness of their excuse.
This insight has implications for debunking fake news spread online and offline. In particular,
our findings suggest that in order to prevent a given fake news story from spreading, it might be
insufficient to debunk it privately ; instead, it is crucial to generate common knowledge that the
excuse is invalid. Among other platforms, Facebook and Twitter have experimented with various
strategies to curtail the spread of misinformation, including warning users before they post an article
flagged as fake news and flagging fake or misleading news when it appears on users’ timelines (e.g.,
because a friend shared it). The former initiative maps closely onto a “first-order” debunking in
our model (private persuasion), while the second initiative maps onto a “second-order” debunking
(debunking one’s audience). Yet to the extent that these platforms do not yet debunk all users
(more precisely, to the extent that the fact that they does not debunk all users is not common
knowledge), it generates a ready-made excuse for sharing fake news: posters can credibly claim
that they were not warned the news was fake.54 Our results suggest it is important not only to
52In a 1981 interview, Republican strategist and Republican National Committee chairman Lee Atwater described
the strategy as follows: “You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘N—, n—, n—.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘n—’: that hurts
you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights and all that stuff. You’re getting so abstract now
[that] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a
byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I’m not
saying that.” (Lamis, ed, 1999)
53Indeed, a third type of excuse may be a “self-excuse” for politician’s supporters who do not want to admit to
themselves that they endorse racist positions, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2011a).
54Indeed, both Twitter and Facebook’s fact-checking efforts have been widely criticized for a lack of transparency,
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debunk both the poster and the audience, but also to make it clear to the poster that the audience
will know that he or she was debunked before posting. This could be done by including a screenshot
in the warning shown to the poster of what his or her post will look like to others, in which
the sentence “The poster was warned that this link has been flagged as fake or misleading before
posting” is clearly visible. An alternative and simpler path would be to simply roll out the feature
to the entire user-base, generating common knowledge that all users are warned before posting fake
news. Because the general equilibrium results of such a change differ significantly from the partial
equilibrium results by creating common knowledge, current estimates of the effects of debunking
on users’ propensity to share fake news may substantially understate the true effects that would be
realized if platforms were to fully scale up the feature.
Our results suggest several directions for further research. First, what implications do our
results have for the “supply side” of excuses: can “excuse entrepreneurs” who are able to generate
common knowledge about plausible rationales to act in a potentially stigmatized manner cause
striking reversals of social norms, even if their persuasive impact is limited, and can similar patterns
help explain the rising popularity of ideologically extreme media outlets? Moreover, can growing
partisan polarization in media consumption make excuses more effective by allowing partisans to
more credibly claim that they have not been exposed to information contradicting their views?
and it is thus certain that most users lack information about how the platforms fight misinformation. (Nyhan,
Brendan. “Why the Fact-Checking at Facebook Needs to Be Checked.” The New York Times, October 23, 2017.)
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Figures
Figure 1: Experiment 1: Structure of design
Consent, attention check,
demographics
Information about Lott (2018)
Excuse
- "Your matched respondent
was informed about Dr. Lott's study"
- Your matched respondent decided to
authorize the $1 donation to Fund the Wall
Perceived motive (open-ended)
"Why do you think your matched
respondent chose to donate to Fund
the Wall?
Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale
"If you had to guess, how do you think
your matched respondent scored on the
Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale?"
Gullibility Scale
"If you had to guess, how do you think
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Notes: Figure 2 displays the results from Experiment 2, conducted in February 2020 with a sample of 3,047
Democrats. Panel (a) shows the fraction of respondents who used words related to gullibility across the ‘No
Excuse’ and the ‘Excuse’ condition. Panel (b) shows the fraction of respondents who used words related to
intolerance across the ‘No Excuse’ and the ‘Excuse’ condition. Panel (c) shows the mean guess of the matched
respondent’s score on the Gullibility Scale across the ‘No Excuse’ and the ‘Excuse’ condition. Panel (d) shows
the mean guess of the matched respondent’s score on the (negative of the) Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale scale
across the ‘No Excuse’ and the ‘Excuse’ condition. The figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals as well as
p-values for tests of equality of means across the conditions.
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Information about Lott (2018)
No Excuse Excuse Control
Reconsent
"I consent to researchers accessing...first and last
name, city, and operating system."
Description of public donation decision and
website screenshot
"The page lists individual donation decisions and
whether each participant decided to authorize the
donation to Fund the Wall"
No Excuse: Excuse manipulation
"The page states that all participants made
their decisions before Dr. Lott's study was
published"
Excuse: Excuse manipulation
"The page states that all participants were




"Would you like to authorize a $1 donation to Fund
the Wall?"






















Notes: Figure 4 displays the results from Experiment 1, conducted in January 2020 with a sample of 3,728
Republicans and Independents. The figure displays donation rates to “Fund the Wall” across the Control group,
the ‘No Excuse’ group, and the ‘Excuse’ group. The figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals as well as
p-values for tests of equality of means across the conditions.
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Figure 5: Experiment 3: Structure of design




Clip from Tucker Carlson Tonight on the link between
illegal immigration and crime
Link
Link to Tucker Carlson Tonight clip
Private support
"Would you like to join a campaign to immediately




Link to Tucker Carlson Tonight clip
Tweet decision
Would you like to authorize the following Tweet?
I have joined a campaign to immediately deport all illegal
Mexican immigrants. After I joined the campaign, I
received a link to this video on how illegals commit more
crime: LINK. Sign this petition to immediately deport all
illegal Mexicans: LINK.
Tweet decision
Would you like to authorize the following Tweet?
I have joined a campaign to immediately deport all
illegal Mexican immigrants. Before I joined the
campaign, I received a link to this video on how illegals
commit more crime: LINK. Sign this petition to
immediately deport all illegal Mexicans: LINK.
Debrief
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Notes: Figure 6 displays the results from Experiment 3, conducted in March 2021 with a sample of 517 Republicans
and Independents. The figure displays the fraction in each treatment arm that were willing to post an anti-
immigrant Tweet. The figure displays 95 percent confidence intervals as well as the p-value for a test of equality
of means across conditions.
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Tables
Table 1: Experiment 1: Inferred donation motives
Dependent variable:
Inference about partner’s donation motive
Used keyword Predicted inference about score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Inference about intolerance
Excuse −0.070∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
DV mean 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000
DV std. dev. 0.339 0.339 0.339 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 3,047 3,047 5,065 3,045 3,045 5,061
R2 0.010 0.029 0.025 0.004 0.023 0.021
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.024 0.022 0.004 0.019 0.018
Panel B: Inference about gullibility
Excuse 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
DV mean 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000
DV std. dev. 0.275 0.275 0.275 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 3,047 3,047 5,065 3,045 3,045 5,061
R2 0.003 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.046 0.040
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.041 0.037
Demographic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Include pilot data No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 of Panel A is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent
uses a word relating to bias when describing why he or she thinks the matched respondent donated to Fund
the Wall. The dependent variable in Columns 4-6 of Panel A is the predicted z-score of the (negative of the)
Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale, where the prediction is based on the respondent’s description of their matched
respondent’s motive. The dependent variables of Panel B are analogous, but instead consider words related to
gullibility and the predicted score on the Gullibility Scale. Demographic controls include age, age squared, a
set of race indicators, a Hispanic indicator, a male indicator, a set of education indicators, and a set of partisan
affiliation indicators. Robust standard errors are reported.
40
Table 2: Experiment 1: Inferred bias and gullibility scores
Dependent variable:
Inference about partner’s score
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Bias (z-score)
Excuse −0.134∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.039)
Observations 1,524 1,524 2,532
R2 0.004 0.038 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.029 0.032
Panel B: Gullibility (z-score)
Excuse 0.321∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.039)
Observations 1,523 1,523 2,533
R2 0.026 0.065 0.059
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.056 0.053
Demographic controls No Yes Yes
Include pilot data No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the negative of the
z-score of the respondent’s guess as to his or her matched respon-
dent’s score on the Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale, where we take
the negative to interpret higher values as greater bias. The depen-
dent variable in Panel B is the z-score of the respondent’s guess as
to his or her matched respondent’s score on the Gullibility Scale.
Both scales were originally scored between 0 and 100. Demographic
controls include age, age squared, a set of race indicators, a His-
panic indicator, a male indicator, a set of education indicators, and
a set of partisan affiliation indicators. Robust standard errors are
reported.
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Table 3: Experiment 2: Main results
Dependent variable:
Donated to Fund the Wall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excuse 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.027) (0.025) (0.014)
Control −0.001 −0.005 −0.001 0.017
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
p-value (Excuse = Control) 0.0013 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Demographic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Waves included Main Main Main + Pilot Replication Replication All
DV mean 0.488 0.488 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.498
DV std. dev. 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Observations 3,751 3,751 4,457 1,373 1,373 5,913
R2 0.004 0.187 0.197 0.004 0.130 0.171
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.183 0.194 0.004 0.120 0.168
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent donated to Fund the Wall. Columns 1-2
report results estimated on the sample from the main experiment; Column 3 pools the sample from the main experiment
with the sample from the pilot; Columns 4-5 consider only the sample from the replication experiment; and Column 6
pools all waves. Demographic controls include age, age squared, a set of race indicators, a Hispanic indicator, a male
indicator, a set of education indicators, and a set of partisan affiliation indicators. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table 4: Experiment 2: County heterogeneity
Dependent variable:
Donated to Fund the Wall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excuse 0.061∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.041 0.026 0.064∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.029) (0.027) (0.014)
Excuse × County Republican vote share −0.030 −0.038∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.069∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027) (0.026) (0.014)
Control −0.002 −0.005 −0.002 0.015
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Control × County Republican vote share 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.014
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
County Republican vote share 0.052∗∗∗ 0.020 0.017 0.012 0.027 0.018∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010)
Demographic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Waves included Main Main Main + Pilot Replication Replication All
DV mean 0.488 0.488 0.497 0.497 0.497 0.498
DV std. dev. 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Observations 3,631 3,631 4,315 1,215 1,215 5,608
R2 0.013 0.192 0.203 0.009 0.133 0.176
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.188 0.199 0.007 0.120 0.173
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent donated to Fund the Wall. The county Republican vote
share is from the 2016 US Presidential election and is scaled to a standard normal distribution. Columns 1-2 include both Independents
and Republicans, Columns 3-4 limit the sample to Republicans, and Columns 5-6 limit the sample to Independents. Columns 1, 3, and 5
report results estimated on the sample from the main experiment, while Columns 2, 4, and 6 pool the sample from the main experiment
with the sample from the pilot. Demographic controls include age, age squared, a set of race indicators, a Hispanic indicator, a male
indicator, and a set of education indicators, and a set of partisan affiliation indicators. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Excuse 0.168∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Demographic controls No Yes Yes
Partisan controls No Yes Yes
DV mean 0.563 0.563 0.563
DV std. dev. 0.497 0.497 0.497
Observations 517 517 517
R2 0.029 0.066 0.067
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.042 0.041
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if
the respondent chose to schedule the post. Demographic controls
include age, age squared, a set of race indicators, a Hispanic in-
dicator, a male indicator, a set of education indicators, and a a




We present a simple model of communication that formalizes the strategic implications of a publicly
known rationale for xenophobic expression. Our framework is closely related to the canonical model
by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) on image concerns and other related models (Ali and Bénabou, 2020;
Golman, 2020; Jia and Persson, 2019; Besley et al., 2019; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011b; Hillenbrand
and Verrina, 2020). We abstract away from many of the considerations in these related models
to highlight our key conceptual contribution: the implications of heterogeneity across two action-
relevant type dimensions for equilibrium inference and behavior.
A society consists of a continuum of agents who differ on two dimensions. First, some are
tolerant toward foreign cultures (i = 0), while others are intolerant (i = 1). Second, some are easily
persuaded by the given rationale (“persuadables”) whereas others are not. The two dimensions are
independent; the probability that a given agent is tolerant is given by p ∈ (0, 1), and the probability
that a given agent is persuadable (which can be viewed as a measure of the credibility of a given
rationale) is q ∈ (0, 1).55 Agents’ individual types are private information, though the distribution
of types is common knowledge. At the beginning of the game, two agents are randomly drawn from
the society: one agent is the “sender” while the other is the “receiver.” The sender and receiver are
exposed to an anti-immigrant rationale. The sender can choose either to take an anti-immigrant
action (a = 1) or not to take this action (a = 0).56 The receiver observes the sender’s action and
makes an inference about whether the sender is tolerant or intolerant.
The persuadable sender is non-strategic, with actions characterized as follows: in the absence
of viewing anti-immigrant information, the tolerant-persuadable sender does not take the anti-
immigrant action, while the intolerant-persuadable sender takes the action. However, once exposed
to anti-immigrant information, the tolerant-persuadable sender is persuaded and induced to take
the action57; the intolerant-persuadable sender takes the action, as before.
55The credibility of a rationale may be influenced by a number of factors, including the credibility and reach of
the public figures who spread the rationale.
56Equivalently, we can interpret this as choosing between an anti-immigrant action (a = 1) and a pro-immigrant
action (a = 0), or choosing between no action (a = 1) and a pro-immigrant action (a = 0). In our experimental
setting, the anti-immigrant action corresponds to authorizing a $1 donation to Fund the Wall, an organization that
seeks to fund the proposed US-Mexico border wall.
57Differences in persuasion may arise because some people are more gullible than others, and thus the posterior
probability that these gullible types assign to the event that the story is true shifts further from their prior than that
of non-gullible types. Alternatively, these differences may arise because some people will be more affected if the state
of the world implied by the rationale is true, and thus they are more willing to take the anti-immigrant action than
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The non-persuadable sender is strategic and receives social utility proportional to the receiver’s
belief that the receiver and sender share the same tolerance type. In particular, when the receiver
believes with certainty that the sender is of the same tolerance type, the sender receives social
utility b, while when the receiver believes with certainty that the sender is of the opposite tolerance
type, the sender receives social utility b, with b > b. Given that the probability of being matched
with a tolerant receiver is p and the probability of being matched with an intolerant receiver
is 1 − p, the sender’s social utility from being perceived as tolerant with certainty is given by
b0 := pb+(1−p)b, while the sender’s social utility from being perceived as intolerant with certainty
is given by b1 := pb + (1 − p)b. For simplicity, we assume that the sender’s utility is not directly
affected by the receiver’s inference about the sender’s persuadability. This assumption can be
relaxed without affecting any of the main results below, so long as the image cost of being perceived
as persuadable is lower than the image cost of being perceived as intolerant.
Thus, the sender’s expected social utility of inducing the receiver to believe with probability π
that the sender is tolerant is given by b(π) = πb0 + (1 − π)b1. We assume that p > 0.5 such that
b0 > b1, i.e. the expected social utility from being perceived as tolerant is strictly greater than the
expected social utility from being perceived as intolerant.58
Both types of non-persuadable senders also receive expressive utility v > 0 from taking an
action consistent with their tolerance type: in particular, the intolerant sender receives v when
choosing to take the anti-immigrant action and 0 otherwise, while the tolerant sender receives v
when they choose not to take the anti-immigrant action and 0 otherwise. The utility function of
the non-persuadable sender with tolerance type a = i is thus given as follows:
ui (a, π) = v1{a=i} + πb0 + (1− π)b1.
Let π(a) denote the receiver’s posterior belief that the sender is tolerant after observing the
sender’s action a. Then, the following proposition holds:
other agents even if they assign the same probability to the event that the rationale is true as other agents. Said
differently, differences in persuasion may arise from differences in belief updating or from differences in payoffs.
58This assumption implies that the sender wants to be perceived as intolerant if they think their matched receiver
is more likely to be intolerant than tolerant. Alternatively, we could assume that the sender always prefers to be
perceived as tolerant irrespective of whether the receiver is more likely to be tolerant or intolerant. With p > 0.5,
the model yields virtually identical results under this alternative assumption. That is, we can redefine b0 := b and
b1 := b and the remainder of this section would be identical under this alternative assumption.
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Proposition 1. Non-persuadable senders’ optimal actions are as follows59:
a∗0 (π(·)) = 1{π(1)−π(0)> vb0−b1 }, (4)
a∗1 (π(·)) = 1{π(1)−π(0)>− vb0−b1 }. (5)
In other words, assuming π(1) < π(0) (that is, the receiver believes senders who take the anti-
immigrant action are more likely to be intolerant than senders who do not take the action), the
tolerant non-persuadable agent never takes the action, while the intolerant non-persuadable agent
takes the action if and only if the social image cost of doing so is small relative to the expressive
utility. In what follows, we take the expressive utility v as given and endogenize π.
We consider the equilibria of two separate games, which map to our experimental conditions. In
the No Excuse (NE) game, the receiver holds incorrect beliefs about the sender’s information set
(and this is known to the sender): the receiver believes with certainty that the sender did not see
the anti-immigrant rationale prior to choosing her action. Thus, the receiver believes that there is
no persuasion effect operating on the sender, and the receiver therefore believes with certainty that
a sender who takes the action is intolerant, i.e. π(a = 1) = 0. In contrast, in the Excuse (E) game,
the receiver (correctly) believes with certainty that the sender has seen the anti-immigrant rationale
prior to choosing her action. Thus, the receiver no longer knows with certainty that a sender who
takes the action is intolerant, since he knows he may be matched with a tolerant-persuadable sender
who was persuaded by the anti-immigrant information to take the action.60 Our solution concept
for both games is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, in which π(·) is consistent with
each type of sender’s actions and follows Bayes’ rule when possible. We adopt the intuitive criterion
to refine the set of off-path equilibria in the Excuse game (Cho and Kreps, 1987).61
59We assume that the sender does not take the action when she is indifferent between taking and not taking the
action. The results in the section do not depend on this assumption.
60We view intolerance and persuadability as independent dimensions. An alternative interpretation might be that
many agents are biased precisely because they are gullible: that is, they believe what they are exposed to, and they are
simply exposed to more anti-minority information than pro-minority information. One implication is that providing
the receiver with information relevant to the sender’s type is likely to move the receiver’s inference about the sender’s
intolerance and the sender’s persuadability in the same direction. In Experiment 1, we find evidence that receivers’
posteriors about senders’ intolerance and persuadability, as measured by both an open-ended text analysis procedure
and structured measures of beliefs, generally move in opposite directions, suggesting that this alternative channel
may be limited in its quantitative importance. While the open-ended text may only capture the first motivation that
comes to mind, the (incentivized) structured beliefs measures are not subject to this concern.
61In our model, persuadable and non-persuadable receivers are identical. In particular, tolerant-persuadable
receivers who are persuaded by the anti-immigrant organization still judge intolerant senders in the same manner
as tolerant-persuadable receivers, capturing the intuition that people care about the motivations behind others’
actions. Moreover, persuadable receivers still use Bayes’ rule to make inferences about the sender’s motivations. We
could alternatively model persuadable and non-persuadable receivers differently, such that persuadable receivers take
senders’ actions at face value: in other words, such that they believe with probability one that donors are intolerant
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The fact that the tolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not take the action in either game is im-
mediate, since both social and expressive utility are strictly greater when the tolerant-nonpersuadable
sender does not take the action than when she does.62 When expressive utility v is small relative
to social utility, the intolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not take the action either in the Ex-
cuse game or the No Excuse game because the social image costs of taking the action outweigh
the expressive benefits. In contrast, when expressive utility v is large relative to social utility, the
intolerant-nonpersuadable sender takes the action in both the Excuse game and the No Excuse
game. For expressive utility v within a certain parameter range, there exists an equilibrium in
which the intolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not take the action under the No Excuse game
but takes the action under the Excuse game, assuming that the share of persuadable agents is suf-
ficiently large to allow intolerant-nonpersuadable agents to pool with tolerant-persuadable agents.
We formalize this claim in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose that
(1− p) (b0 − b1)
1− qp
< v ≤ p (b0 − b1)
p+ q (1− p)
and q < p
2
2p2−2p+1 .
Then, there exists a unique equilibrium in the No Excuse game, and there exists a unique equilibrium
in the Excuse game satisfying the intuitive criterion. The tolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not
take the action in either game, while the intolerant-nonpersuadable sender takes the action only in
the Excuse game.
Given the existence of the equilibrium as in Proposition 2, the following is an immediate corollary
from the sender’s equilibrium actions under the two conditions.
Corollary 1. In the equilibria as in Proposition 2, the receiver’s posterior belief that a sender who
takes the action is intolerant is lower in the Excuse game than in the No Excuse game:
1− πNE (1) = 1 > 1− p
1− pq
= 1− πE (1) .
Moreover, the receiver’s posterior belief that a sender who takes the action is non-persuadable is
and non-donors are tolerant. This alternative model would narrow the set of parameter values under which we
observe our equilibria of interest, as described in Proposition 2, but would leave our model’s predictions qualitatively
unchanged.
62The fact that expressive utility from not donating is greater than from donating is by definition, while the fact
that social utility from not donating is greater than social utility from donating follows from the assumption that
p > 0.5.
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higher in the No Excuse game than in the Excuse condition:
ϑNE (1) = 0 <
q (1− p)
1− qp
= ϑE (1) ,
where ϑ(a) is the receiver’s posterior belief after observing action a that the sender is non-persuadable.
The reasoning is straightforward: because the receiver believes that only the intolerant-persuadable
sender takes the action in the No Excuse game, we have ϑNE (1) = 0. In contrast, in the Ex-
cuse game, the receiver believes that intolerant-persuadable, tolerant-persuadable, and intolerant-
sophisticated senders all take the action. Thus, we have ϑE(1) = q(1−p)(1−q)+q(1−p) =
q(1−p)
1−qp .
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The tolerant sender (i = 0) chooses to take the anti-immigrant action (a = 1) if
v1{0=0} + π (0) b0 + (1− π (0)) b1 = u0 (0, π (0)) < u0 (1, π (1)) = v1{1=0} + π (1) b0 + (1− π (1)) b1
⇔ v + π (0) b0 + (1− π (0)) b1 < π (1) b0 + (1− π (1)) b1
⇔ v < (π (1)− π (0)) (b0 − b1)
⇔ π (1)− π (0) > v
b0 − b1
,
where the final inequality follows from the inequality b0 − b1 > 0. The intolerant sender (i = 1)
chooses to take the anti-immigrant action (a = 1) if
v1{0=1} + π (0) b0 + (1− π (0)) b1 = u0 (0, π (0)) < u0 (1, π (1)) = v1{1=1} + π (1) b0 + (1− π (1)) b1
⇔ π (0) b0 + (1− π (0)) b1 < v + π (1) b0 + (1− π (1)) b1
⇔ −v < (π (1)− π (0)) (b0 − b1)
⇔ π (1)− π (0) > − v
b0 − b1
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
No Excuse game In the No Excuse game, the receiver believes that the sender has not seen the
anti-immigrant information, so he expects the intolerant-persuadable sender to take the action and
the tolerant-persuadable sender not to take the action. If both the tolerant-nonpersuadable and
the intolerant-nonpersuadable senders do not take the action, Bayes’ rule requires that πNE(1) = 0
and πNE(0) = pp+q(1−p) . Letting Si and Gi denote type-i ∈ {0, 1} non-persuadable and persuadable
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senders, respectively, Bayes’ rule gives:
πNE (0) =
Pr (G0, S0)
Pr (S0, S1, G0)
=
(1− q) p+ qp
1− (1− q) (1− p)
=
p
p+ q − pq
=
p
p+ q (1− p)
.
Because the tolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not take the action, the optimality condition for
the intolerant-nonpersuadable sender, (5), yields the second inequality.
a∗0 = 0⇔πNE (1)− πNE (0) = −
p














p (b0 − b1)
p+ q (1− p)
.
We now verify that no other pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the No Excuse condition. First,
observe that if a∗0 = 1 then it must be that a
∗
1 = 1 from the optimality conditions. That is, we can
rule out equilibria in which a∗0 = 1 and a
∗
1 = 0. It remains to rule out the following equilibria: (1)
a∗0 = 1 and a
∗
1 = 1; and (2) a
∗
0 = 0 and a
∗
1 = 1.
(i) The receiver’s posterior beliefs are:
πNE (1) =
Pr (S0)
Pr (S0, S1, G1)
=
qp
1− p (1− q)
, πNE (0) = 1
⇒ πNE (1)− πNE (0) = qp
1− p (1− q)
− 1 = − 1− p
1− p (1− q)
< 0.
This violates the optimality condition for S0.
(ii) The receiver’s posterior beliefs are:
πNE (1) = 0, πNE (0) = 1
⇒ πNE (1)− πNE (0) = −1.
Thus, the optimality condition for S0 is satisfied. For the optimality condition for S1 to be
satisfied, we need that
−1 > − v
b0 − b1
⇔ v > b0 − b1.
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But this contradicts the hypothesis of Proposition 2, which implies that
v ≤ p
p+ q (1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
(b0 − b1) < b0 − b1 ⇒ v ≤ b0 − b1.
Excuse game In the Excuse game, the receiver expects both types of persuadable senders to
donate. Since we look for an equilibrium in which the tolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not




Pr (G0, G1, S1)
=
(1− q) p




∈ (0, 1) .
Because the tolerant-nonpersuadable sender does not donate, the intolerant-nonpersuadable sender’s
optimality condition yields the first inequality:
a∗0 = 0 =⇒ πE (1)− πE (0) =
p (1− q)
1− qp
− 1 ≤ v
b0 − b1
=⇒ p (1− q)− 1 + qp
1− qp




=⇒ − 1− p
1− qp
≤ 0 ≤ v
b0 − b1
,
a∗1 = 1 =⇒
p (1− q)
1− qp









=⇒ v > (1− p) (b0 − b1)
1− qp
.
We appeal to the intuitive criterion to rule out equilibria in which both tolerant- and intolerant-
nonpersuadable senders donate in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the receiver cannot use
Bayes’ rule if he observes that the sender does not donate. Given on-path belief, the first inequality
implies that the intolerant-nonpersuadable sender cannot benefit by deviating to not donating,
regardless of the receiver’s belief. In particular, in this equilibrium, we have π̃E(1) = Pr(G0, S0) = p.









= v + pb0 + (1− p) b1.
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The best that she can do by deviating to a = 0 is:
max
π
u1 (0, π) = b (π) = b0.
Hence, a = 0 is dominated if
v + pb0 + (1− p) b1 > b0 ⇔ (1− p) (b0 − b1) < v.
This is satisfied by the hypothesis of Proposition 2, since
(1− p) (b0 − b1) <
(1− p) (b0 − b1)
1− qp
< v.
Hence, by the intuitive criterion, the receiver must believe that any deviation from a = 1 is made
by tolerant-nonpersuadable agents; i.e., π̃E(0) = 1. In this case, we have
π̃E (1)− π̃E (0) = − (1− p) < 0.
This violates the optimality condition for S0, which rules out the possibility that both the tolerant-
and intolerant-nonpersuadable senders donate in the (refined) equilibrium. Thus, the intuitive
criterion requires the receiver to believe that the sender is intolerant if he observs the sender
donating, which, in turn, implies that it is not optimal for the tolerant-nonpersuadable sender to
donate.
We proceed to verify that other pure strategies cannot be part of any equilibrium. By the same
argument in the No Excuse game, we can rule out the case in which a∗0 = 1 and a
∗
1 = 0. It remains
to rule out the possibility that a∗0 = 0 and a
∗








so that πE(1)−πE(0) = 0. But this violates the optimality condition for the intolerant-nonpersuadable
sender, since 0 6≤ − vb0−b1 < 0.
The condition on q ensures that 0 < (1−p)(b0−b1)1−qp ≤
p(b0−b1)
p+q(1−p) , i.e. that there exists some v > 0
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that satisfies the set of inequalities in the statement of Proposition 2.
0 <
p (b0 − b1)
p+ q (1− p)






p+ q (1− p)
=⇒ (1− p) (p+ q (1− p)) < p (1− qp)
=⇒ p+ q (1− p)− p2 − pq (1− p) < p− qp2
=⇒ q (1− p)− p2 − pq + qp2 < −qp2






=⇒ q < p
2
2p2 − 2p+ 1
.
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B Appendix Figures and Tables
B.1 Experiment 1









Bachelors degree or higher 0.46 0.36
Observations 5065 4005
Notes: Table displays mean characteristics for the Experiment 1 sample
and the 2018 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel, Wave 39.
Attriters dropped from sample.
Table B2: Experiment 1: Balance of covariates
Overall Excuse No Excuse p-value
mean std.dev. mean mean (E=NE)
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 41.376 15.639 41.703 41.048 0.247
Black 0.182 0.386 0.186 0.179 0.612
Asian 0.045 0.208 0.049 0.042 0.386
White 0.710 0.454 0.703 0.716 0.455
Hispanic 0.140 0.347 0.136 0.144 0.561
Male 0.450 0.498 0.451 0.448 0.840
High school diploma 0.983 0.130 0.983 0.983 0.998
Bachelors degree 0.446 0.497 0.454 0.439 0.391
Notes: p-values based on robust standard errors reported. Attriters dropped from sample.
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Table B3: Experiment 1: Relationship between perceived motive and scores
Dependent variable:
Inference about partner’s score
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Bias (z-score)
Used bias word 0.477∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.072) (0.056)
Constant −0.078∗∗∗ −0.301 −0.149
(0.027) (0.281) (0.222)
Observations 1,524 1,524 2,532
R2 0.028 0.061 0.061
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.052 0.056
Panel B: Gullibility (z-score)
Used gullibility word 0.520∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.088) (0.070)
Constant −0.039 −0.055 −0.107
(0.026) (0.302) (0.234)
Observations 1,523 1,523 2,533
R2 0.022 0.059 0.046
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.051 0.041
Demographic controls No Yes Yes
Include pilot data No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the negative of the
z-score of the respondent’s guess as to his or her matched re-
spondent’s score on the Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale, where
we take the negative to interpret higher values as greater bias.
The dependent variable in Panel B is the z-score of the respon-
dent’s guess as to his or her matched respondent’s score on the
Gullibility Scale. Both scales were originally scored between 0
and 100. Demographic controls include age, age squared, a set
of race indicators, a Hispanic indicator, a male indicator, a set of
education indicators, and a set of partisan affiliation indicators.
Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table B4: Experiment 1: Condition prediction confusion matrix
Predicted Excuse Predicted Excuse
True Excuse 212 185
True No Excuse 194 188
Overall accuracy: 0.5135
Notes: Each cell reports the number of individuals who were assigned to the
condition (Excuse or No Excuse) in the corresponding row and who were
classified by the Support Vector Machine as belonging to the condition in
the corresponding column. The classifier was trained on a 75% sample of
the data; the table reports prediction results on the test set of the remaining
25% of the data. Overall accuracy is calculated as the proportion of correct
predictions.
























Continued on next page
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Excuse × Age −0.003
(0.003)
Excuse × Age squared 0.00002
(0.00003)
Excuse × Black 0.038
(0.047)
Excuse × Asian −0.014
(0.062)
Excuse × White 0.049
(0.042)
Excuse × Hispanic 0.026
(0.031)
Excuse × Male −0.004
(0.020)
Excuse × High school 0.017
(0.062)
Excuse × Some college, no degree −0.0003
(0.060)
Excuse × Associate degree −0.007
(0.066)
Excuse × Bachelor degree 0.018
(0.062)
Excuse × Post-bachelor degree −0.005
(0.066)
Excuse × Strong Democrat 0.014
(0.022)
DV mean (no excuse) 0.093
Continued on next page
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Table B5 – Continued from previous page
Attrited
(1)




Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 if the respondent attrited post-randomization.
Robust standard errors are reported.
B.2 Auxiliary Experiment
Table B6: Punishment of intolerant vs. gullible types
Dependent variable:
Authorized $1 bonus to partner
(1) (2)




Demographic controls No Yes
Observations 646 646
R2 0.012 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.033
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if
the respondent authorized a $1 donation to their partner. The
omitted group is subjects matched with an Intolerant (rather than
Gullible) partner. Demographic controls include age, age squared,
a set of race indicators, a Hispanic indicator, a male indicator, a
set of education indicators, and a set of partisan affiliation indi-
cators. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Figure B1: Donation to intolerant vs. gullible types
Notes: Figure B1 displays the results from the survey eliciting differential punishment of intolerant vs. gullible
partners. The figure shows the fraction of respondents who chose to authorize a donation to their partner,
separately by experimental condition, as well as 95 percent confidence intervals.
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B.3 Experiment 2



















Bachelors degree or higher 0.37 0.34
Observations 2487 2622
Notes: Table displays mean respondent characteristics from the Exper-
iment 2 sample and the 2018 Pew Research Center’s American Trends
Panel Wave, 39. Attriters dropped from sample.
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Table B8: Experiment 2: Balance of covariates
Overall Excuse No Excuse Control p-values
mean std.dev. mean mean mean (E=NE) (E=C) (NE=C)
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 44.954 15.709 45.083 44.823 44.958 0.681 0.840 0.826
Black 0.076 0.266 0.070 0.088 0.072 0.100 0.858 0.135
Asian 0.043 0.203 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.877 0.567 0.677
White 0.821 0.383 0.825 0.815 0.823 0.498 0.858 0.609
Hispanic 0.110 0.313 0.113 0.108 0.110 0.691 0.829 0.852
Male 0.499 0.500 0.493 0.507 0.497 0.484 0.830 0.618
High school diploma 0.976 0.152 0.977 0.975 0.977 0.821 0.981 0.798
Bachelors degree 0.378 0.485 0.392 0.368 0.374 0.229 0.352 0.770
Republican 0.426 0.495 0.419 0.437 0.421 0.368 0.920 0.414
Notes: p-values based on robust standard errors reported. Attriters dropped from sample.
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Table B9: Experiment 2: Party heterogeneity
Dependent variable:
Donated to Fund the Wall
Republicans Independents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excuse 0.067∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Control −0.009 −0.010 0.003 0.012
(0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 1,593 1,973 2,158 2,484
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value (Excuse = Control) 0.0076 < 0.001 0.0055 0.0082
Include pilot data No Yes No Yes
DV mean 0.669 0.673 0.354 0.357
DV std. dev. 0.471 0.469 0.478 0.469
R2 0.070 0.050 0.132 0.048
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.043 0.126 0.042
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent
donated to Fund the Wall. Columns 1-2 limit the sample to Republicans,
while Columns 3-4 limit the sample to Independents. Columns 1-2 report
results estimated on the sample from the main experiment; Column 3 pools
the sample from the main experiment with the sample from the pilot; Columns
4-5 consider only the sample from the replication experiment; and Column 6
pools all waves. Demographic controls include age, age squared, a set of race
indicators, a Hispanic indicator, a male indicator, a set of education indicators,
and a set of partisan affiliation indicators. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table B10: Experiment 2: Perceived purpose of study
Dependent variable:
Excuse Immigration attitudes Public image Information Persuasion Biased
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excuse −0.005 0.009 0.020∗∗ 0.012 −0.013 −0.0001
(0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
Control −0.003 0.129∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.081∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
p-value (Excuse = Control) 0.63 < 0.001 0.12 0.093 < 0.001 0.0082
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include pilot data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DV mean 0.007 0.226 0.082 0.239 0.121 0.175
DV std. dev. 0.084 0.419 0.275 0.427 0.326 0.380
Observations 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,536 4,537 4,535
R2 0.004 0.027 0.018 0.011 0.023 0.009
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.024 0.014 0.007 0.019 0.006
Notes: The dependent variable in each column is an indicator taking value 1 if the respondent’s perceived purpose of the study was
coded to fall into the corresponding category. “Excuse” takes value 1 if the respondent correctly inferred the study was about whether
knowing that others will know one had an “excuse” for donating would affect the donation decision. “Immigration attitudes” takes value
1 if the respondent stated the study was about attitudes toward immigration. “Public image” takes value 1 if the respondent stated
the study was about whether knowing one’s decision will be observable to others would affect the donation decision. “Information”
takes value 1 if the respondent stated the study was about disseminating information about immigration. “Persuasion” takes value 1 if
the respondent stated the researchers were attempting to persuade them either to donate or not to donate. “Bias” takes value 1 if the
respondent stated the researchers were biased. “Other” takes value 1 if the respondent stated a purpose that did not fall into any of the
above categories. Categories other than “Other” are not mutually exclusive. All specifications pool the main experiment and the pilot
and contol for demographics and partisan affiliation. Demographic controls include age, age squared, a set of race indicators, a Hispanic
indicator, a male indicator, and a set of education indicators. Partisan affiliation controls include dummies for strong Republican, weak
Republican, Republican-leaning Independent, and Democrat-leaning Independent. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Excuse × Age −0.003
(0.004)
Excuse × Age squared 0.00003
(0.00004)
Excuse × Black 0.078
(0.075)
Excuse × Asian −0.049
(0.089)
Excuse × White 0.0003
(0.060)
Excuse × Hispanic 0.028
(0.047)
Excuse × Male 0.007
(0.028)
Excuse × High school 0.071
(0.081)
Excuse × Some college, no degree 0.039
(0.080)
Excuse × Associate degree 0.081
(0.085)
Excuse × Bachelor degree 0.081
(0.081)
Excuse × Post-bachelor degree 0.096
(0.087)
Continued on next page
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Table B12 – Continued from previous page
Attrited
(1)
Excuse × Rep-leaning Ind −0.014
(0.036)
Excuse × Weak Rep 0.045
(0.045)
Excuse × Strong Rep 0.008
(0.036)
DV mean (no excuse) 0.166




Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 if the respondent attrited post-randomization. The
sample is limited to respondents in the Excuse and No Excuse condition. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table B11: Experiment 2: Condition prediction confusion matrices
Panel A: Excuse vs. No Excuse
Predicted Excuse Predicted Excuse
True Excuse 213 244
True No Excuse 210 210
Overall accuracy: 0.4823
Panel B: Control vs. No Excuse
Predicted Excuse Predicted Excuse
True Control 197 180
True No Excuse 136 283
Overall accuracy: 0.6030
Panel C: Control vs. Excuse
Predicted Excuse Predicted Excuse
True Control 188 159
True Excuse 136 315
Overall accuracy: 0.6303
Notes: Each cell reports the number of individuals who were assigned to the
condition in the corresponding row and who were classified by the Support
Vector Machine as belonging to the condition in the corresponding column.
Each panel limits the data to the corresponding two conditions. The classi-
fiers were trained on a 75% sample of the limited dataset; the table reports
prediction results on the test set of the remaining 25% of the limited dataset.
Overall accuracy is calculated as the proportion of correct predictions.
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Table B13: Experiment 3: Balance of covariates
Overall Excuse No Excuse p-value
mean std.dev. mean mean (E=NE)
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 49.422 13.623 48.709 50.094 0.248
Black 0.014 0.116 0.012 0.015 0.762
Asian 0.015 0.124 0.016 0.015 0.934
White 0.952 0.215 0.952 0.951 0.955
Hispanic 0.066 0.248 0.052 0.079 0.214
Male 0.503 0.500 0.490 0.515 0.571
High school diploma 0.994 0.076 0.996 0.992 0.598
Bachelors degree 0.385 0.487 0.343 0.425 0.055
Notes: p-values based on robust standard errors reported. Attriters dropped from sample.
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C Ethical Considerations
Ethically conducting revealed-preference experiments on public xenophobic behavior in this setting
requires balancing three often contradictory objectives: avoiding explicitly deceiving respondents,
avoiding compromising respondents’ privacy, and avoiding increasing public xenophobic expres-
sion.63 In this section, we describe how our experimental design balances these objectives.
C.1 Common considerations for Experiments 1–3
The information on the link between illegal immigration and violent crime we provide to respondents
(the Lott (2018) study in Experiments 1 and 2 and the clip from Tucker Carlson Tonight in
Experiment 3) paints an incomplete picture of the academic literature, which generally finds null
or negative effects of illegal immigration on violent crime. Although we do not endorse either piece
of evidence — indeed, we explicitly inform respondents in Experiments 1 and 2 that the Lott study
has been challenged by reputable sources — we nonetheless debrief all respondents at the end of the
study, providing them with an accessible academic overview of the link between illegal immigration
and violent crime and a list of further readings.
C.2 Considerations for Experiment 2
Preserving participant privacy Given that our mechanism examines the effect of perceived
social stigma on behavior, it is crucial that respondents in Experiments 2 and 3 believe that their
decisions will be visible to others.
In Experiment 2, we asked participants to consent to us accessing their name and city from their
survey provider (which confirmed that we could collect this data subject to participant consent). All
participants had the option to terminate the survey if they did not consent. We informed those that
consented that upon the publication of the Lott study in a reputable academic journal, we would
post the results from the survey, including their individual donation decision, on our study website.
While we intend to do so should the study be published in a reputable academic journal, this
statement is somewhat misleading because it is unlikely that the study will ever be published (given
its methodological errors and the fact that Lott has rarely published in peer-reviewed academic
journals over the past decade). Despite participants consenting to us accessing and publishing their
63Of course, we obtained approval from multiple Institutional Review Boards to conduct our experiment.
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names, and the fact that only a small minority of the Republican and Independent participants are
likely to be uniquely identifiable based on their first and last name alone (i.e. absent geographical
or other identifiers), we still viewed it as desirable to preserve their anonymity: the formulation of
our experiment allows us to do so with high probability.
Excuse manipulation Conceptually, in the No Excuse condition for Experiment 2, we would like
to show respondents a website screenshot stating that “No participants were told about Dr. Lott’s
study”. However, because these participants did in fact learn about the study, such a screenshot
would be deceptive. Instead, we exploit the fact that Lott’s study had not yet been published in
an academic journal (a fact about which we explicitly informed all respondents when describing
the website). In particular, we show respondents a website screenshot stating that “We surveyed
respondents earlier this year before Dr. Lott’s study was published.” In the survey, we write that
“the website states that you were surveyed before the study was published and does not mention
that you were shown an early summary of the study’s findings.” Respondents in this condition thus
believe that their audience will believe that they (the respondents) had no information excusing
their decision to donate to Fund the Wall.
This formulation is misleading in that it relies on an academic, rather than commonplace,
understanding of the word “published” (that is, “published in an academic journal” rather than
“made available for public readership”). However, survey respondents themselves are not misled, as
they are fully aware of the study’s status and are fully aware of what others reviewing the donation
decisions are likely to believe. The group that may be misled is thus the group who visit the website
listing donation decisions. Given the low probability that this website will ever be published (see
Section C.2) we and our Institutional Review Board felt comfortable using this formulation.
C.3 Experiment 3
Twitter login All respondents were required to log in via their Twitter accounts to the “Tweet-
ability” app we created. This app is governed by the Twitter API’s terms of service and has the
second most restrictive set of permissions among the three application scopes Twitter provides
(“Read” and “Write”). That is, the app does not have access to users’ passwords, messages, or
account settings, but it is able to post Tweets from the users’ accounts. We do not use this func-
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tionality in any way, and no information that could compromise users’ accounts is ever accessed
or downloaded. We explicitly inform respondents of the app’s permissions in transparent language
and give them the option to end the survey if they are uncomfortable granting the app these per-
missions. We also inform respondents that the app’s data, including the tokens that give us access
to post on their accounts, will be deleted by no later than August 1, 2021.
Twitter posts Our key outcome is whether respondents are willing to post a Tweet including
a link to a petition to immediately deport all illegal Mexican immigrants. We were not willing
to consider designs that asked respondents to actually post such Tweets. We thus asked them to
“schedule” their Tweet for the future (using the Tweetability app), to be posted “if/when we have
finished surveying people in all US counties”. Because we targeted fewer total respondents than
the total number of US counties, these posts will never be published. This formulation is therefore
misleading, even if it is not explicitly deceptive. Given our desire to avoid leading respondents to
publicly post anti-immigrant content as part of our survey, we and our Institutional Review Board
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D Survey instruments: Experiment 1


















D.4 Post-treatment questions and debrief
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E Survey instruments: Experiment 2A
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Information about Lott Study: Excuse and No Excuse condition
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Reconsent
Description of donation decision
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G Survey instruments: 1b – intolerant vs. gullible





G.2 Treatment 1: The Gullibility Scale
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G.3 Treatment 2: The Foreign Culture Tolerance Scale
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H.6 Treatment: No excuse
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H.7 Treatment: Excuse
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